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Janusz Bugajski’s Washington View: Biden’s Russian Roulette

The long-standing debate on whether the US can fight two simultaneous major wars continues to rage. But a much more immediate question is whether Washington and Brussels can handle several concurrent crises incited by Russia any of which could trigger armed conflict and necessitate a NATO military response. And such crises would include the Western Balkans.

Moscow is well-versed in tactical deception and disguising its near-term goals, and can prepare several concurrent conflictswhether directly, through proxies, or with willing accomplices. Russia’s mounting military threat against Ukraine has focused NATO’s attention on the eastern pilar of European security, as Moscow’s assemblage of army, naval, and air power has surrounded Ukraine, but other potential battlefields are also being prepared.

To bolster his threat against Ukraine, Putin has issued demands on NATO that he knows will be rejected, but he is testing to see whether they will divide Western governments and neutralize European societies. And indeed, several US and European policy analysts have fallen into the trap of believing that if NATO stops including new members and Ukraine is sacrificed to Russia’s imperialism then the West will be able to coexist peacefully with Moscow. Short-sighted appeasement has never worked with expansionist dictators, let alone with Tsarist imitators like Putin who view neighboring countries as part of their divine-given heritage.

If the Kremlin decides on another military assault against Ukraine to cower the government in Kyiv into submission, it will also engineer distractions elsewhere. And the Western Balkans are a primary target for diversionary crises. Russian officials and their internationally active security services have been preparing the ground for conflict for several years and have reliable allies in Belgrade and Banja Luka to launch new offensives and undermine the NATO presence.

Two simultaneous crises are coming to a head in the region – inside Bosnia-Herzegovina and inside Montenegro, and they can coincide with another Russian invasion of Ukraine. The government of Republika Srpska is Moscow’s primary instrument, whose calls for separation from Bosnia-Herzegovina will light the fuse for armed conflict. Bosnian Serb leaders have blocked decision-making in national institutions and launched a process to withdraw from the armed forces, tax system, and judiciary. They have also voted to establish separate state bodies for the Serb entity in preparation for a referendum on secession. As new laws are drafted and the RS constitution is amended the entity looks set to abandon all Bosnian state institutions, in which case the administrative structure will collapse.

This push toward partition will be resisted by the Bosniak population whose lands were seized by Serbian nationalist forces during a campaign of genocide in the 1990s. Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik has been encouraged in his moves toward secession by a weak Western response through limited sanctions and verbal warnings by US and EU officials. The US sanctions,applied as punishment for corruption and endangering Bosnia's stability and territorial integrity, are well intentioned but ultimately weak. Dodik can simply turn to Putin to replenish any embezzled assets in return for the pursuit of secession.

Moscow has also been preparing the ground to regionally buttress the new Serbian state once it declares independence. It has constructed a Moscow axis in the region encompassing the corrupted political leadership in Hungary and Slovenia who will be encouraged to oppose Bosnia’s integrity. The uncertain role of the Bosnian Croat leadership and of Zagreb itself is also a cause for concern and whether they will side with Sarajevo to maintain the state or conspire with Banja Luka, Belgrade, and Moscow to carve it up.

And above all, Moscow has cultivated the Vučić government in Belgrade. It is both openly and covertly supporting its mini-imperialist project in the Western Balkans through weapons supplies, security assistance, propaganda, disinformation, and other tools of influence to subvert and weaken Serbia’s neighbors. Indeed, a second Western Balkan front has already opened for Moscow in Montenegro. The government crisis in Podgorica is escalating, in which pro-Western forces inside and outside the current coalition are pitted against the Serb nationalist parties backed by Belgrade and Moscow.

Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokapić, widely viewed as a tool of the pro-Muscovite Serbian Orthodox Church, has fueled the crisis by trying to prevent the formation of a more representative government, preparing a coup to dismiss elected officials, and seekingunconstitutional control over the police. If the pro-Western parties, representing the majority of Montenegro’s citizens, are blocked from holding new elections while the Serbianization process intensifies then Montenegro faces the violent conflict that it managed to avoid during the collapse of Yugoslavia.

Political violence and state fragmentation in Bosnia and Montenegro will be welcomed in the Kremlin. It would demonstrate that even NATO intervention or Alliance membership cannot hold a country together and that both the US and EU are powerless in stopping pro-Russian forces from advancing in the region. Russian intelligence services can also capitalize on other Balkan disputes. The creation of an autonomous Serbian municipal association in Kosova would provide Moscow with an additional inroad of subversion.

Moscow has spent the first year of the Biden administration probing and testing potential US weaknesses and it now sees a period of strategic opportunity. Washington must be prepared to confront several international crises that will not only require intensive diplomacy but the prospect of dispatching military forces to prevent or terminate local wars. At the same time, Germany and France are proving to be unreliable allies, fearful of “provoking” Putin and hesitant in using military force. Once again, the United States will be required to avert a wider war. The EU security project so loudly trumpeted in Paris and Berlin should then be added to the collection of Hans Christian Anderson’s Fairy Tales.

 

Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. His recent book, Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks, is co-authored with Margarita Assenova. His new book, Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture, will be published this Spring.

Zločini u Ukrajini i mogućnost njihovog procesuiranja: Pred Međunarodnim krivičnim sudom može završiti i sam Putin

Kada su 1991.godine počinjali ratovi u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, međunarodna zajednica i domaće sudstvo (koje je bilo u fazi rasformiranja i ponovnog osnivanja) su bili zatečeni, kada je riječ o procesuiranju krivičnih djela iz generičke grupe ratnih zločina. Postojalo je iskustvo Međunarodnog vojnog tribunala-takozvanog Nirnberškog suda, pred kojim je procesuiran djelić ratnih zločina nacista, Međunarodnog vojnog suda za Daleki istok, pred kojim je procesuiran dio rukovodstva Japana, lokalna suđenja poslije Drugog svjetskog rata (SFRJ, Italija, Njemačka, Izrael), te krajnje upitna suđenja tokom i nakon rata u Vijetnamu. Međutim, većina ovih suđenja su se odvijala u situaciji neposredno nakon Drugog svjetskog rata, sa veoma problematičnim postupkom sa gledišta pravičnosti suđenja-npr.pred Međunarodnim vojnim sudom nije bilo propisano pravo na žalbu na presudu.

U maju 1993.godine Vijeće sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija jednoglasno je usvojilo Rezoluciju broj 827 i formalno osnovalo Međunarodni krivični sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju (MKSJ). 1994.godine, nakon genocida i drugih zločina počinjenih u Ruandi, na sličan način-Rezolucijom broj 955-Vijeće sigurnosti UN je osnovalo Međunarodni krivični sud za ratne zločine počinjene na području Ruande. Iako su oba ova tribunala izložena brojnim (djelomično opravdanim) kritikama-prije svega u odnosu na promjenjivost pravila koja mjenjaju same sudije, dugotrajnost postupaka, nepostojanje sistema reparacije žrtava ili osoba koje su oslobođene odgovornosti, a provele su godine u pritvoru-sudska praksa ovih sudova je unijela tektonske promjene u međunarodno krivično pravo. Definisani su elementi krivičnih djela, vidova učešća u izvršenju krivičnih djela, procesuirani su vrhovi država i naroda.

Nakon toga, osnovan je Međunarodni krivični sud (ICC), koji je stalna ustanova, osnovana na temelju Rimskog statuta Međunarodnoga krivičnog suda koji je stupio na snagu 1. jula 2002.godine. MKS je osnovan u značajnom dijelu na temeljima MKSJ i MKSR, sa jednom značajnom iznimkom, koja može biti vezana za događaje u Ukrajini. Naime, u ranim jutarnjim časovima 15.decembra 2017.godine, u sjedištu UN, države članice Rimskog statuta su se saglasile da aktiviraju nadležnost Međunarodnog krivičnog suda i u slučajevima zločina agresije-četvrtog osnovnog zločina (pored genocida, zločina protiv čovječnosti i ratnih zločina). Ovo znači da će prvi put nakon suđenja u Nurembergu i Tokiju, međunarodni sud moći suditi liderima za individualnu krivičnu odgovornost za vođenje agresivnog rata. Ova rezolucija je stupila na snagu 17. jula 2018.godine.

Međunarodno pravo je kristalno jasno-državi je zabranjeno korištenje sile protiv druge države, bez obzira na ciljeve (postoje samo dvije iznimke, kada država postupa u samoodbrani i kada postupa temeljem Rezolucije Vijeća sigurnosti UN-niti jedna od ovih situacija ne postoji u djelovanju Rusije protiv Ukrajine). Danas, bilo koji pokušaj odlučivanja o krivičnoj odgovornosti Rusije mora biti posmatran kroz strukturu MKS.

Shodno Rimskom statutu, zločin agresije je definisan kao: “planiranje, priprema, pokretanje ili izvršenje, od strane osobe koja je u poziciji da učinkovito vrši kontrolu nad ili da usmjerava političku ili vojnu akciju države, čina agresije koji po svom karakteru, težini i razmjeru predstavlja očito kršenje povelje Ujedinjenih naroda”. Jasno je da, u skladu sa ovim definicijom, krivična odgovornost Vladimira Putina nije uopšte sporna.

Rusija nije članica Rimskog statuta, ali nije sve izgubljeno-Međunarodni krivični sud je ove sedmice potvrdio da ima nadležnost na teritoriji Ukrajini, a samim tim i nad djelima ruskih vojnika i Vladimira Putina, iako Rusija nije potpisnica. Naime, 2014.godine je Ukrajina prihvatila nadležnost MKS, pa sada MKS može istraživati ratne zločine i zločine protiv čovječnosti koje počini vojska Ruske Federacije, čiji vrhovni komandant je Vladimir Putin.

U ovom trenutku, MKS je zaprimio zahtjev 39 država članica za otvaranje istrage za zločine u Ukrajini (Albanija, Australija, Austrija, Belgija, Bugarska, Kanada, Kolumbija, Kostarika, Hrvatska, Kipar, Češka, Danska, Estonija, Finska, Francuska, Gruzija, Njemačka, Helenska republika (Grčka), Mađarska, Irska, Island, Italija, Latvija, Lihtenštajn, Litvanija, Luksemburg, Malta, Novi Zeland, Norveška, Nizozemska, Poljska, Portugal, Rumunija, Slovačka, Slovenija, Španija, Švedska, Švicarska, Velika Britanija). Ono što je bitno naglasiti je to da ovi zahtjevi omogućavaju Kancelariji tužioca MKS da otvori istragu o situaciji u Ukrajini od 21.novembra 2013.godine, a koji se tiču bilo kakvih navoda o ratnim zločinima, zločinima protiv čovječnosti i genocidu, u bilo kom dijelu Ukrajine, počinjenih od strane bilo koje osobe.

Ono o čemu u ovom trenutku se već može izvjesno govoriti je granatiranje civilnih ciljeva i civila u urbanim i gusto naseljenim područjima, koristeći neprecizno oružje, vođenje agresivnog rata (član 8bis Statusa MKS). Problem sa krivičnim djelom agresije je nadležnost-vršenje nadležnosti nad ovim zločinom je u  ovom trenutku onemogućeno jer, prvo, MKS nema nadležnost nad zločinom kada su ga počinili državljani ili na teritoriju države koja nije stranka (član 15. bis (5) Statuta MKS-a); i drugo, Vijeće sigurnosti UN-a ovu situaciju nije uputilo tužiocu MKS-a (član 15. ter Statuta MKS-a).

Tužioci u zemljama u koje prelaze izbjeglice iz Ukrajine (posebno u Poljskoj) vrše saslušanja izbjeglica u svojstvu svjedoka, kako bi se blagovremeno prikupili dokazi. Po prvi put, dokazi za djela iz generičke grupe ratnih zločina se prikupljaju i novim tehnologijama, putem aplikacije eyeWitness to Atrocities, odnosno, očevidac zločina, koja kombinira pravo i tehnologiju, a faktički znači da se događaji snimaju mobilnim aparatom, a aplikacija ih pretvara u metadata koji su neophodni da se dokaže autentičnost istih pred sudom. Nakon toga, stvara se odgovarajući lanac čuvanja snimaka i fotografija, koji će omogućiti korištenje ovom tehnologijom prikupljenih dokaza u sudskim postupcima.

Glavni tužilac MKS, Karim A.A. Khan, QC je naglasio: “Niti jedan pojedinac u situaciji u Ukrajini nema dozvolu za počinjenje zločina pod jurisdikcijom Međunarodnog krivičnog suda.”. Istražitelji Kancelarije tužioca su upućeni na teren u četvrtak, 03.03.2022.godine, a glavni tužilac je izjavio da će njegova Kancelarija pratiti lanac komandovanja do samog vrha, ako istražioci utvrde da su počinjeni ratni zločini.

Ako MKS izda naredbe za hapšenje političkog ili vojnog rukovodstva Rusije, isti vjerovatno neće biti izvršeni dok se te osobe nalaze na poziciji moći. S druge strane, primjeri drugih situacija (npr.bivši predsjednik Sudana Omar Al Bashir) pokazuju da nijedan režim, koliko god autokratski ili nasilan bio, nije vječan. U slučaju promjene režima, nije nezamislivo da Vijeće sigurnosti UN uputi predmet MKS.

Mora se uzeti u obzir i drugi aspekt radi kojeg je širenje informacija o istrazi MKS važno-istom su obuhvaćeni komandanti Ruske vojske na terenu, kao i same trupe. Činjenica da oni mogu biti uhapšeni i procesuirani mnogo jednostavnije od Vladimira Putina sigurno neće djelovati ohrabrujuće na njih u smislu borbenog morala.

Treći aspekt je činjenica da istraga MKS dodatno delegitimizira režim u Rusiji, jer uprkos propagandi i političkom nasilju, u samoj Rusiji nema toliko podrške ratu. Antiratni protesti su svakodnevni, a preko 7000 ljudi je uhapšeno tokom samo prve sedmice rata.

Za razliku od ratova na teritoriji bivše Jugoslavije ili događaja u Ruandi, čini se da je međunarodno pravosuđe mnogo spremnije, a što zasigurno mođe djelovati samo obeshrabrujuće za sve uključene u invaziju na Ukrajinu…jer svi putevi izgleda vode u Hag.

(analizu je napisao pravni eksper koji je godinama radio u Haagu, ali zbog prirode posla ne može biti potpisan pod tekst)

Pregovori će biti, ako, možda,budu: Moldavija ispred BiH na evropskom putu!

U dramatičnom finišu, Evropska komisija ipak je odlučila dati preporuku da se Bosni i Hercegovini dodijeli pregovarački status o ulasku u Evropsku uniju.

Otvaranje pregovora s BiH počet će kad se određeni kriteriji ispune.

“Otvorili smo vrata širom, pozvali da BiH uđe, ali da bi se ušlo, rezultati se moraju vidjeti”, poručila je Ursula von der Leyen, predsjednica Evropske komisije.

Šta to znači?

Prije i iznad svega, sve dok Evropsko vijeće – tijelo koje daje finalno odobrenje ili odbijanje za bilo koju suštinsku odluku EU – ne kaže svoje, preporuka ne znači ništa.

Jer je moguće da tijelo u kojem sjedi 27 premijera ili predsjednika članica Evropske unije odbije preporuku Komisije.

I to ne bi bilo ništa novo. Dešavalo se puno puta da Evropsko vijeće ne podrži stavove Evropske komisije.

No, prema onome što se moglo čuti iz izlaganja Von der Leyen, kao i komesara za proširenje EU Olivera Varhelyija, oni se nadaju da ih lideri EU neće odbiti.

Zato je za Ukrajinu i Moldaviju data jasnija preporuka o početku procesa pregovaranja s četiri, odnosno tri “preduslova”. I Von der Leyen je rekla da će s ove dvije države aktivnosti na početku pregovora početi “odmah nakon što Evropsko vijeće da zeleno svjetlo”.

Kada je BiH u pitanju, kriteriji su (puno) strožiji.

Uz pohvale za formiranje vlasti u relativno kratkom roku, za napredak u pojedinim segmentima vladavine prava, uključujući i suzbijanje pranja novca, Evropska komisija iznijela je cijeli niz zahtjeva za (istinskim) reformama.

One se primarno tiču – opet – vladavine prava. U tom kontekstu se ističe i potreba reformiranja Izbornog zakona Bosne i Hercegovine.

Zahtijeva se i provođenje socio-ekonomskih reformi gdje “nije poduzet niti jedan korak”, kako piše u Izvještaju.

Također, zahtijeva se i uvođenje sankcija Rusiji zbog agresije na Ukrajinu. Navodi se da je BiH tu poduzela “neke korake”, ali da entitet Rs blokira dalje korake na tom planu. Manji bh. entitet blokirao je i usvajanje trećeg Sporazuma o mobilnosti iz Berlinskog procesa – onog koji se tiče putovanja po teritorijama svij šest zapadnobalkanskih država samo s ličnom kartom, te se od BiH traži da riješi i taj problem.

Zahtjeva se i opsežnija reforma javne uprave, uz napomenu da su “neki iskoraci zabilježeni”, ali da to nije dovoljno.

Iako su usvojene izmjene i dopune Zakona o Visokom sudskom i tužilačkom vijeću (VSTV), one se moraju mijenjati, posebno u segmentu prijave imovine sudija i tužilaca. Promjene moraju biti u skladu s zahtjevima Venecijanske komisije.

“Nezavisnost i nepristrasnost pravosuđa nije poboljšano”, piše u Izvještaju o napretku BiH.

“Tamno-siva” je i slika borbe protiv korupcije i organiziranog kriminala.

Ako bi se u prostu rečenicu sažimala ocjena Komisije, onda bi najispravnije bilo napisati da je BiH “šuplja kao švicarski sir”.

Nema iskoraka u borbi protiv korupcije, posebno one ‘visoke’, sudski sistem teško pati zbog neprofesionalnosti, političkog utjecaja, nepostojanja kvalitetne razmjene informacija, neujednačene sudske prakse… Na sve to dolazi i eksplicitna ocjena da je policija “podložna utjecaju politike”. A da ne pišemo šta su rekli o zaplijeni imovine saradnji s Eurojustom i Uredom javnog tužioca EU…

“Proaktivan pristup ostaje od suštinskog značaja u borbi protiv infiltracije kiminalnih elemenata u politički, pravni i ekonomski sistem”, piše dalje u Izvještaju.

Entitet Rs posebno je “žigosan” u segmentu slobode medija i prava novinara na neometen rad. I u tom režim Milorada Dodika označen je kao krivac za “nepotrebno kretanje unazad”.

Kada su migracije i migranti u pitanju, Evropska komisija ponovila je i malo pojačala “pozitivnu” ocjenu iz izvještaja od prošle -2022. godine. No, odmah je zatraženo da se poduzmu “hitni” koraci ka jačanju kontrole granice i sistema azila.

Iako ni ocjena u oblasti ekonomskih kriterija nije baš “grdna”, Program ekonomskih reformi BiH je ocijenjen kao i više nego “grdan”.

On “nastavlja biti jadnog kvaliteta i limitira provedbu reformi”, piše u Izvještaju.

Slična je i ocjena u oblasti spremnosti BiH da prihvata pravnu stečevinu EU. To je ogroman set dokumenata pravnih normi Unije i jedan je od ključnih preduslova za pristupanje ovom bloku. Evropska komisija traži bitna poboljšanja procedura javnih nabavki i jako je nezadovoljna aktivnostima BiH za provođenje popisa stanovništva i dobara.

“Ograničeni” ili “nikakav napredak” potom se nižu u cijelom nizu oblasti.

A onda se “poentira” poražavajućom ocjenom da “BiH nije napravila nikakav napredak u obkasti resursa, poljoprivrede i kohezije (poljoprivredni i ruralni razvoj, sigurnost hrane, veterinarstvo i fitosanitarna politika, ribarstvo i vodne površine, te finansijske i budžetske odredbe), gdje su pripreme uglavnom u početnoj fazi”.

Na kraju se “poentira” s korištenjem IPA fondova.

Taj novac koji EU daje državama koje žele u članstvo i dalje se u BiH slabo koristi.

Izvještaj o napretku Bosne i Hercegovine prema Evropskoj uniji u 2023. godini ima čak 142 stranice.

Detaljna “krvna slika” stanja u našoj državi odražava i nadu i frustraciju.

Gledano iz Brisela, oni su uradili maksimum koji su mogli. Pa i više od toga. Iz svojih razloga.

Sada istinski izazov ostaje da vlasti (ali i opozicija) urade svoj dio posla. I tu smo onda u belaju!

Sve ovo, još jednom, pod uslovom da Evropsko vijeće na samitu 14 i 15. decembra odobri dodjelu početka pregovora s EU Bosni i Hercegovini nekada naredne godine, kada se ispune neophodni preduslovi.

Suma sumarum – kada se pogleda sve što se dešavalo i dešava zadnjih dana u Briselu i oko njega, Bosna i Hercegovina je opet nezasluženo “pogurana”. Prema svim relevantnim ocjenama stručnih ljudi, nismo zaslužili ni kandidatski status, a ona nam je odobren u decembru prošle godine.

Sada se kreće prema novom iskoraku dok Holandija, Njemačka, ali i Francuska glasno gunđaju i ponavljaju stav da je od kraja 2022. godine BiH nazadovala, a ne napredovala.

Evropska komisija na to je odgovorila i (neuobičajeno) jasnim imenovanjem nekih od glavnih krivaca.

Pa se entitet Rs na 142 stranice p(r)oziva čak 95 puta, mahom zbog opstrukcija i ometanja evropskog puta BiH.

Time je, faktički, loptica odgovornosti prebačena na Evropsko vijeće koje bi trebalo onda pokrenuti sankcione mehanizme koji uključuju i stavljanje na “crnu listu” Dodika i klike.

Evropska komisija i tu je uradila svoj dio posla obustavivši više od milijardu KM vrijedne projekte.

Dakle, da sumiramo, Brisel je uradio svoje. Iskorak je mnogo veći nego li je prvotno planirano. Sada je do vlasti BiH. Trenutna euforija je više nego neutemeljena! Umjesto slavljeničkih postova na društvenim mrežama vlasti bi se odmah morale latiti posla. Umjesto svađe s novinarima, neka – za početak – riješe pitanje slobodnog putovanja po šest država zapadog Balkana samo s ličnim kartama. Eto, barem to!

(politicki.ba)

Janusz Bugajski’s Washington View: Ukraine Must Triumph

Even before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many poorly informed Western analysts urged Kyiv to capitulate. These experts believed that the allegedly mighty Russian army would rapidly overrun Ukraine’s forces and they implored NATO not to provokePutin by supplying desperately needed weapons to Kyiv. Over a month into its war of national liberation, Ukraine is again advised by an assortment of observers to placate Moscow by surrendering Donbas and Crimea and disarming itself through neutrality.

Such analysts fail to understand that the post-Cold War era is over and there are no neutral states on the front line between a free Europe and an imperial Russia. A country like Ukraine, committed to its independence and territorial integrity, needs to be part of an effective security structure. Kyiv has made it abundantly clear that it seeks real security guarantees, whether inside or outside NATO, and not vague promises from the West. And Ukraine of all countries has proven through its national resilience and fighting prowess that it will defend European security as well as its own.

Any negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow should not be misconstrued. Ukraine is not negotiating from a position of weakness but of growing military strength. It has pushed back Russian forces on several fronts, killed over 16,000 Russian troops, and destroyed hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters, aircraft, and other pieces of military equipment. Kyiv is primarily talking to Moscow to relieve pressure on civilians arbitrarily bombed by Russian troops and to ensure humanitarian aid. For Russia, the objective is to push the West into neutralizing Ukraine while pressing Kyiv to agree to the status of a disarmed vassal. As in previous “peace talks” the Kremlin engages in open blackmail, in which either Ukraine’s sovereignty is curtailed, or more Ukrainian civilians will be murdered.

The war crimes committed by Russian troops are not only acts of desperation. Moscow deliberately massacres unarmed civilians so that videos of bombed schools and hospitals will influence the West into pressuring Ukraine toward a unilateral ceasefire. However, the atrocities against civilians are having the reverse effect. They are stiffening Ukraine’s resolve and resistance, increasing Western weapons supplies, and raising support for a complete sanctions ban on Russian trade and energy. Sanctions contribute to depriving Russia of the resources it needs to execute the war and to function as a society.

Ukraine needs to triumph in this war both to deter any future attacks by Moscow and to inflict a painful lesson for Russia’s imperial ambitions. A completed victory would include the full withdrawal of Russian troops from all occupied territories, including Donbas and Crimea. At the same time, sanctions should continue to be imposed until Putin and his regime are ousted, while billions of dollars of Russia’s frozen assets in Western financial institutions are earmarked for Ukraine’s reconstruction. In his recent speech in Warsaw, President Biden in effect called on Russia’s citizens to remove Putin’s regime or face economic devastation.

Kyiv is seeking strong international security guarantees to deter any future military aggression. This indicates either steps toward NATO membership or a treaty with NATO or the US that would ensure Ukraine receiving all necessary weapons and other support for deterrence and self-defense. Russia itself cannot be a party to guaranteeing Ukrainian security because it remains Ukraine’s only security threat that violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum – an agreement signed by the US, the UK, and Russia to ensure Ukraine’s security after Kyiv surrendered its nuclear weapons.

As Russia’s war against Ukraine continues, Kyiv has every right to conduct missile strikes and sabotage operations against airfields and other military targets inside neighboring regions of Russia that are hosting attacks on Ukrainian territory. Such a response will furtherraise morale in Ukraine and make it more difficult for Moscow to hide the war from its own people. Washington and Brussels cannot restrain a country that is fighting for its survival to strike wherever it can against a genocidal enemy, similarly to resistance armies during the German Nazi occupation.

Ukraine is exactly the kind of country that NATO needs as a member, one that fully understands the Russian adversary, displays remarkable military prowess, and is committed to defending a free Europe. When a country joins NATO, the chances of a Russian attack significantly diminish, as we have seen with the much smaller and weaker Baltic states. Although Moscow persistently threatens Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, it has not intervened militarily because it clearly fears an overwhelming NATO response led by the US.

The Kremlin continues to engage in fear campaigns about nuclear annihilation and world wars to undermine Western cohesion. While any use of strategic nuclear weapons against the West is remote, given that it will mean national suicide, Moscow could use short-range tactical nuclear or chemical weapons against Ukrainian targets. Such an escalation would also provoke NATO retaliation, as Biden has indicated, and could directly involve US forces against the source of the attack.

Western governments should avoid unwittingly assisting the Kremlin’s fear campaign by warning of World War III in the event of any direct NATO involvement in Ukraine. Russia’s military is no match for NATO and will avoid any direct confrontation. In addition to the organizational inadequacies, equipment failures, andmanpower shortages exposed in Ukraine, Russia faces an unprecedented economic catastrophe that will seriously deplete its military capabilities. The country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is projected to contract by at least 15% in 2022 and essential parts for its military industry will no longer be available.

In addition, Moscow has no reliable allies. Even Belarus and the Central Asian states in the Moscow dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) do not want to fight on behalf of Russia’s imperialism. Moreover, China will avoid being drawn into war with the US and will more likely prepare to acquire energy sources and valuable Siberian and Far Eastern territories once Russia begins to implode.

(Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. He is the co-author of Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks with Margarita Assenova. His new book, Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture, will be published this Spring)

Janusz Bugajski’s Washington View: Pan-regional Resistance To Prevent Serbia’s Hegemony

Serbia’s foregone parliamentary election results on December 17 will embolden the Aleksandar Vučić government to intensify its mini-imperialist agenda in the Western Balkans. At the same time, Serbia’s democratic opposition will remain too weak and divided to challenge Belgrade’s neo-Milošević objectives. In order to defend themselves more effectively from any expanding subversion and aggression, several countries neighboring Serbia should pursue a coordinated plan of regional resistance.

Serbia is expanding its hegemonistic goals by pressuring, destabilizing, or dominating neighboring governments in Sarajevo, Prishtina, and Podgorica, as well as by pursuing regional integration formats such as the Open Balkans. It is high time for Kosova, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to demonstrate that they are not prepared to be supplicants or passive bystanders. The Greater Serbia project can be resisted through a pan-Balkan freedom initiative in which each state pledges to uphold their mutual independence. Such an initiative will require inter-governmental and inter-societal coordination in four primary arenas – national, political, economic, and informational.

The core of statehood is either a strong ethno-national identity or a binding multi-national civic identity. European states commonly combine both, in which loyalty to the country does not necessarily depend on your ethnic origin but the state still possesses an ethno-national base with a historic national identity. In the case of states that are challenged by imperial neighbors or ethno-national separatist movements sponsored by these neighbors, an effective assertion of both national and state identity is necessary. Hence, Bosniak and Montenegrin political leaders, activists, and intellectuals need a more active domestic and international campaign to promulgate their distinct histories, cultures, and languages. Montenegrins in particular need to protect themselves against growing Serbianization promoted by Belgrade and its political proxies including the Serbian Orthodox Church.

In the political realm, subordination to Serbia would not only eradicate state sovereignty and national independence; it would also contribute to establishing Russian political bases around the region that will diminish Western integration and cohesion. Hence, the US administration and EU governments need to be lobbied more intensively to preclude any scenarios that challenge state independence, as this will undermine the region’s European and Atlanticist orientation. In effect, the capabilities of separatists in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova need to be thwarted.

Reports that Serbian security forces and nationalist radicals are storing weapons in Orthodox churches and monasteries in Montenegro and Kosova in preparation for organized violence must be fully investigated. Any illicit arms caches must be confiscated, the perpetrators arrested, and Belgrade’s goals exposed. Reported Russian-sponsored paramilitary training camps in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska cannot be allowed to operate and the EU can either demonstrate its strategic autonomy by closing these premises and defusing armed conflicts or request direct assistance from NATO.

NATO itself needs to take a much more proactive role to deter anti-state violence throughout the region by increasing troop numbers in Kosova, patrolling the entire northern border with Serbia, and positioning forces and equipment for a swift intervention in case of provocations. Moreover, each targeted state needs to prepare their armed forces and devise contingency plans for dealing with armed clashes engineered by Belgrade and Moscow through their local collaborators. They can also coordinate their planning with neighbors and boost intelligence collection and sharing on any emerging threats.

In the economic dimension, a region-wide initiative is long overdue in exposing and acting upon politically linked corruption. Cooperating governments can boost their efforts in rooting out subversive Russian money in their economies and unearth the political leverage that hides behind it. Any companies in the Balkans connected with the Russian state, its agencies, subsidiaries, and oligarchs must be sanctioned in a common front with the EU and US against Kremlin aggression. Any Bosnian, Montenegrin, or Kosovar companies that continue to collaborate with Russian businesses are in effect betraying the national and state interests of their countries.

At the same time, the region’s governments need to better coordinate their EU aspirations. It clearly benefits each state to have their neighbors qualify for Union membership. Cooperation toward meeting the legal and regulatory requirements of the EU Chapters can also enhance perceptions in Brussels that serious efforts are being intensified in the region regardless of Serbia’s essentially anti-EU position. The EU candidate states in the Western Balkans can emulate the Visegrad Four initiative, in which Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia assisted each other in qualifying for the EU and NATO. A similar process was also evident between the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Pan-regional resistance to Serbia’s hegemony also needs to be undergirded by a comprehensive informational initiative. Inexplicably, despite years of Moscow’s information war, Western diplomats are insufficiently responsive to the ongoing campaign of political disinformation and anti-Westernism emanating from Belgrade through the state media, internet influencers, and Vučić’s regional allies and proxies. Greater regional coordination between governments, credible media outlets, civic society organizations, and European and American counterparts can better expose fake information that influences public opinion, undermines state institutions, engenders inter-ethnic hostilities, and destabilizes societies.

Above all, Russia’s plans to spark another war in the Balkans by encouraging and manipulating Vučić’s pan-Serbian ambitions need to be revealed and defeated. As an intimate collaborator in Moscow’s strategic designs, the government in Belgrade must be held accountable and stripped of EU funding until it condemns and thwarts Moscow’s objectives. Instead of engaging in joint initiatives with Serbia, a common front in the Western Balkans can ostracize the Vučić regime as Russia’s imperial proxy. Why provide legitimacy through interactions with a government that is intent on destabilizing, partitioning, or subordinating your state? The strategy of regional resistance cannot wait until armed conflicts are again ignited.

Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. His recent book is Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture. His forthcoming book is titled Pivotal Poland: Europe’s Rising Strategic Player.

 

Janusz Bugajski’s Washington View: Russia-Ukraine War at Center of US Elections

Although foreign policy rarely figures as a major campaign issue in US presidential elections, the Russia-Ukraine war may take center stage in this year’s contest. Both Joe Biden and Donald Trump will claim that they have the solution to ending the war to America’s advantage. And both candidates will accuse the other of betraying US interests.

Over the coming six months before the November elections the war in Ukraine will reach a critical point. Either Russia will successfully mount a major offensive and break through Ukrainian defenses or the Ukrainians armed with a massive new inflow of weapons will break the Russian front and liberate larger swaths of territory. In either scenario, the spotlight will be on the reactions of Biden and Trump.

With a clear majority of America’s public supporting military aid for Kyiv, Ukrainian victories in the coming months will bolster Biden’s candidacy. He will claim that his policies were correct and will blame Republicans in Congress and Trump himself for delaying desperately needed military assistance for several months. Conversely, internationalist Republicans in Congress will blame Biden for any Russian victories because of his slow and incremental supply of weapons and lack of clear strategic objectives. Several Republican Senators assert that Biden has failed to articulate that Russia’s defeat is essential not only for Ukraine’s survival but also for global security and America’s national interests.

Trump himself may realize that opposing Ukraine’s victory may not be popular among a majority of voters and could switch to criticizing Biden for his insufficient help to Kyiv. Biden officials remain fearful that a comprehensive Russian defeat in Ukraine will lead to the collapse of the Russian state. Hence, a failure to supply the most important weapons such as long range missiles and fighter jets was the result of calculations by the White House that a peace settlement was still attainable.

Both Biden and Trump will claim they know how best to deal with Russia. Trump blames Biden for allowing the war to erupt and boasts that he can quickly end the conflict because he understands Putin. He is convinced that good personal relations and transactional policies will enable him to make a deal with Russia’s ruler. Many fear that this would entail Ukraine surrendering Crimea and several eastern regions.

Trump is not an internationalist but veers toward isolationism much like US leaders at the start of World War Two. He is unlikely to appoint traditional Republicans but will rely on nativists and protectionists who seek to limit America’s global role. They are naïve about Moscow’s imperial objectives and could be duped by Putin’s with promises that the Kremlin will not restart the war after consolidating its current gains. Additionally, Trump does not comprehend how a Russian victory will embolden China and Iran to push their own expansionist agendas.

Military funding for Ukraine will continue to figure in the presidential race. Isolationist Republicans claim that the recent aid could be the last major package for Kyiv that passes through Congress. The next infusion of weapons may be needed by early 2025 and Trump will argue that America must primarily fund its domestic needs. Congress may have a decisive voice but at present it is unclear which party will control either chamber. Senate Republicans are more internationalist than their counterparts in the House of Representatives, support military aid to Ukraine, and are more likely to challenge Trump’s isolationism.Conversely, Trump can claim that he was instrumental in releasing funds for Ukraine and could even soften his position by structuring future assistance as a forgivable loan to Kyiv.

An equally dangerous scenario to Russia’s victory in Ukraine is an American military withdrawal from Europe. Both would bring a NATO-Russia war closer. Trump has warned that the US will not defend states that fail to allocate 2% of their Gross Domestic Product for defense. He may scale back America’s troop presence and pursue a grand deal with Moscow with regard to European security even over the heads of staunch allies such as Poland and the Baltic states.

Worries about what Trump might do with NATO triggered the U.S. Congress to write into law a requirement that the legislative branch must approve any US withdrawal from the Alliance. But this may not prevent Trump from ignoring the article five security guarantees and refusing to send US troops into battle even if a NATO member is invaded.

A NATO-skeptic American President could presage trans-Atlantic rifts, encourage Russia’s aggression toward neighbors, and create division between the European allies. A US military downsizing or withdrawal from NATO would cause a leadership vacuum in Europe. It may encourage Germany and France to pursue their “strategic autonomy” plans. However, without a significant military component this initiative will not be accepted by the UK, the Central Europeans, Nordics, and other NATO members most directly affected by the threat from Russia.

A second Trump presidency would place Poland in a particularly pivotal position in European NATO because of its strategic location and military clout. As the growing core of the Alliance, Poland would most likely become the primary target of Russia’s aggression against NATO. Warsaw may calculate that if the broader Alliance is becoming redundant then it will need to create a smaller and better prepared security coalition – a mini “NATO of the willing” – to deter or combat Russia.

Poland will also try to develop a stronger bilateral security relationship with Washington regardless of whether Biden or Trump are elected in November. Trump may actually favor closer military ties that disregard NATO and defense laggards such as Germany. He has praised Poland for its defense spending and maintains a close personal relationship with Polish President Andrzej Duda.

Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. His recent book is Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture. His forthcoming book is titled Pivotal Poland: Europe’s Rising Power.

Janusz Bugajski’s Washington View: What is Putin Afraid of?

Vladimir Putin’s warnings to NATO that it must retreat from Russia’s borders has exposed his fear of failure, both in Ukraine and domestically. Despite his claims, Putin is not afraid of a NATO invasion of Russia or of Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory or against Russian-speakers in Ukraine. His core fear is that an independent and democratic Ukraine together with a NATO umbrella for regional security throughout Eastern Europe will expose the failure of the Russian state and precipitate the collapse of his corrupt authoritarian regime. And paradoxically, another Russian attack on Ukraine would accelerate that process.

 Moscow has threatened Ukraine with an expanding military invasion and amassed tens of thousands of troops with offensive equipment along its northern and eastern borders and intensified its maritime and amphibian forces in occupied Crimea. Putin has simultaneously raised the stakes by issuing what amounts to an ultimatum to Washington. In a diatribe disguised as a document,Moscow has demanded that NATO disarms itself by pulling out troops from all front-line member states, refuse to provide membership to any other post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine and Georgia, and acknowledge Moscow’s sphere of dominance in all countries bordering Russia.

The Joe Biden administration has signaled that it will discuss security questions with the Kremlin in the coming weeks after consulting with its European allies. The high-level talks between US and Russian officials are to be held in Geneva on January 10 and will focus on Ukraine and nuclear arms control. Further dialogue is expected over the following days between NATO officialsand Moscow as well as discussions in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). NATO’s key allies are to be engaged throughout the process.

Given Putin’s radical demands, the White House faces two stark choices – either to try and appease Moscow or to stand firm, reject any ultimatums, and issue its own demands. Any compromises on the core principles of the NATO alliance or even a willingness to scale down NATO’s defensive posture along its eastern flank will encourage the Kremlin to demand a further retreat and claim victory over the West. Any pressure on Ukraine to allow Russia’s proxy separatist entities to gain “special status” will paralyze the state and embolden Putin.

Instead of giving any credibility to Kremlin threats or warnings, Washington should use the opportunity of high-level discussionsto demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and resolve. It can also specify Allied demands on Moscow, including returning Crimea and all of Donbas to Ukraine, removing Russia’s threatening military presence along the borders of all neighboring countries, including NATO members and partners, and terminating attempts to integrate Belarus in Russia’s security structures.

To strengthen the Western hand in preparation for talks with Moscow, Ukraine must be provided with all the weaponry it needs to make a potential Russian invasion as painful as possible. These need to include more effective defenses against missile salvos and air strikes, including Patriot surface-to-air missile systems and Stinger shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. An array of other equipment, including Mi-17 helicopters, initially intended for the Afghan security forces, could also be transferred to Ukraine.

Simultaneously, a list of onerous economic sanctions against Moscow in the event of another military assault against Ukraine can be specified. This must include Russia’s full isolation from financial markets and disconnection from the SWIFT financial messaging network that underpins the global banking system. All foreign assets of Putin and his oligarchic clients would need to be frozen or seized and Kremlin-linked companies blocked. And most importantly, a comprehensive oil and gas embargo of Russia’s exports would push the economy toward bankruptcy.

But why does Putin want “security guarantees” when neither NATO nor Ukraine are threatening Russian territory? The answer is a growing need for an international success amidst mounting fear of domestic crisis. Public acquiescence and regime survival have been increasingly based on an aggressive foreign policy and anti-Westernism to demonstrate Russia’s international influence.However, Putin faces the danger of miscalculating his own power and the domestic crisis will be accelerated by a military defeat amidst economic decline for which the Kremlin will be widely blamed. A further attack on Ukraine would also raise support in Western capitals for increased military capabilities along NATO’s eastern flank.

A deeper invasion and a prolonged military quagmire in Ukraine with mounting losses for Russia’s armed forces will not be sustainable. Regimes that lose wars or cannot win them when they have staked so much on victory invariably collapse in Russia. A major setback in a war with Ukraine, involving mounting casualties and wasted state resources, would propel power struggles and popular revolts against a discredited leadership and highlight the accumulated failures of the Russian Federation.

It is worth remembering that the Tsarist empire collapsed following a military defeat by Japan and a prolonged war with imperial Germany, and the Soviet Union and its East European empire disintegrated in the wake of a failed war in Afghanistan. Putin’s power and credibility and Russia’s survival in its current territorial form would be the casualty of a broader war with Ukraine and an escalating confrontation with the US and NATO.

Putin’s chest-beating abroad indicates that economic and social conditions in Russia are deteriorating and that he may need another foreign escapade to shore up his credibility and ensure his political survival. In a heated recent video conference with Russia’s Presidential Human Rights Council, Putin rejected a proposal to let Russia’s federal regions secede if they no longer wanted to be part of the state. He warned of a repeat of the bloody Yugoslav wars and claimed there were 2,000 territorial claims inside Russia that should be treated “very seriously” as they could rupture the country.

 

Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. His recent book, Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks, is co-authored with Margarita Assenova. His upcoming book is entitled Failed State: Planning for Russia’s Rupture

Kolumna Vildane Selimbegović: Putinova (ne)ispunjena obećanja

Izborna utrka u Bosni i Hercegovini ulazi u finale kampanje, u dane kada najveći broj neodlučnih donosi odluku ne samo za koga će glasati već i hoće li uopće izaći na izbore. I dok je u demokratskom svijetu posve uobičajeno da se anketama ispipava puls birača, što se odnosi i na region, kod nas je jedino u javnost procurilo ispitivanje obavljeno za potrebe međunarodne zajednice i to negdje sredinom ljeta, te svesrpska anketa u kojoj je s obje strane Drine pobijedio Vladimir Putin.

Mrtva trka

Ako i rade istraživanja, stranke ih kriju, no uprkos tome, jasno je zapravo da je najneizvjesnija utrka za bošnjačkog člana Predsjedništva BiH i za predsjednika Republike Srpske. Po onom što ipak curi, mrtva trka između Denisa Bećirovića, iza koga je stala većina opozicionih partija, i SDA-ovog kandidata Bakira Izetbegovića neizvjesnim čini ishod i za drugog člana Predsjedništva BiH iz Federacije. Upravo je po onom istraživanju koje je Ipsos radio za međunarodnu zajednicu Borjana Krišto bila izjednačena sa Željkom Komšićem, što je izgleda za rezultat dalo dodatno minimiziranje vlastite kandidatkinje od partija okupljenih oko HDZ-a, ali i tumačenja koja stižu iz Hrvatske i koja se svode na objašnjenje da bi njezina pobjeda izbila ključni argument HNS-u u razgovorima oko izmjena Izbornog zakona BiH?!

U RS-u, pak, Jelena Trivić navodno neznatno vodi ispred Milorada Dodika, što je poredak i u onoj svesrpskoj anketi u kojoj je Aleksandar Vučić prvi iza Putina. Stoga, valjda, baš nikog i ne čudi što Dodik ovih dana iz svih raspoloživih sredstava nervozno napada na Trivićku, sve spremajući se da usred kampanje ode u Moskvu: posjeta bi trebala biti realizirana sutra ako Putin ne bude imao prečih poslova, a i ako se pojave – vidjeli smo u Sankt Peterburgu – Dodik će strpljivo čekati svojih pet minuta.

Rat u Ukrajini promiješao je političke karte i ma koliko ove rane jeseni u Evropi bilo moderno otkrivati i tražiti olakotne okolnosti za rusku agresiju, mehanizmi su davno pokrenuti, Evropska unija zaoštrava izolaciju Rusije i pritom je sve osjetljivija na neodlučnost poput one koju službeni Beograd jednako ispoljava. Dodikov odlazak Putinu pod noge stoga samo njega podebljava kao simpatizera ratova i učvršćuje mu davno osvojene pozicije na crnim listama. Ubroji li se uz to i ono njegovo, ispostavilo se ni u SNSD-u podržano, posve bespotrebno vrijeđanje i agremansko ponižavanje njemačkog ambasadora, Dodik zapravo postaje ozbiljan problem ovog dijela Balkana, pri čemu uopće ne uzimam u obzir podatak da mu je savjetnik, važniji i od notornog Milana Tegeltije, ruski ambasador u BiH Igor Kalabuhov, s kojim skupa drvi o “miješanju stranaca u unutrašnje državne poslove”.

Njemačka je – za one koji ne znaju – ključni ekonomski partner gotovo svih zemalja Zapadnog Balkana, u Srbiji zapošljava više od 20.000 ljudi, dok su, recimo, ruske investicije u našu zemlju na jedva četiri posto (27 zemalja EU investira iznad 64 posto ukupnih stranih investicija u BiH). Pa i da su sve ruske u RS, opet je u ovom entitetu peti investitor, iza Srbije, Italije, Austrije i Velike Britanije. Najsnažnije uporište Rusije u BiH je u Optima grupi, najvećoj naftnoj kompaniji u našoj zemlji, u 100-postotnom vlasništvu Rusije. Još u onoj kampanji iz 2014. godine Dodik se slavodobitno hvalio Putinovim obećanjima o instantnih 70 miliona eura, pa potom još 250 miliona u narednim godinama (valjda dok on bude na vlasti). Iz Rusije su umjesto miliona u RS (u Federaciji su od Daytona ionako zanemarivo prisutni) stizale samo glavobolje i svako malo polagani kojekakvi kameni temeljci. Nije manjkalo Noćnih vukova koji su se vozikali po našoj zemlji, biznismena obavještajne provenijencije i lica sa Interpolovih potjernica kojima je morao biti uskraćen ulazak u BiH. Zauzvrat, Dodik je nastojao biti dobar domaćin, toliko susretljiv da je ruskom ministru spoljnih poslova Sergeju Lavrovu u znak zahvalnosti što mu je pristao biti i lični gost poklonio ukradenu ukrajinsku ikonu, koja je, na kraju balade, u koferu stranački odanog ambasadora ponovo vraćena u Sarajevo, no istraga o ovom skandalu nikada nije okončana.

Pomaganje Dodikove kampanje

Epilog Putinovih neispunjenih obećanja Dodiku bili bi podaci FIPA iz 2021. koji pokazuju nulu konvertibilnih maraka ruskih ulaganja u RS da nije Glasa Amerike, koji je prošle sedmice objavio da oni milioni ipak nisu pusti snovi: pozivajući se na državnu administraciju, novinari su objavili podatak o frapantnih više od 300 miliona distribuiranih iz Rusije. Po sadašnjem kursu, to je ona ukupna svota koju Dodik u Putinovo ime spominje od 2014. godine, samo što nije riječ o podršci ekonomiji i razvoju i nije u pitanju samo Republika Srpska. To je, naime, ukupna suma koju je Rusija dala političkim partijama u deset zemalja i to baš od 2014. Od onih koje se nas tiču je Dodikov SNSD i crnogorski Demokratski front. “Među primjerima koji su izneseni, prije izbora 2018. godine u BiH, Konstantin Malofejev tajno je pomagao finansiranje predsjedničke kampanje Milorada Dodika. Taj primjer pokazuje da Rusija nije ispunila obećanje da ulaže u ekonomski razvoj Republike Srpske, već je umjesto toga omogućavala korupciju vladajuće stranke i stvorila nejednake uslove za opozicione stranke”, naveo je izvor iz administracije SAD-a. U Crnoj Gori DF se pokazao otprilike onim što je SNSD u BiH, dakle partija koja čini sve da zemlja bude nestabilna. A to i jeste ruska politika na Balkanu, koju je prozreo čak i Nenad Nešić, lider DNS-a, čiji se predizborni spot igra astronomijom da bi završio porukom: Dosta smo gledali Velikog medvjeda.

Janusz Bugajski’s Washington View: NATO can defeat Russia

NATO faces a historic opportunity to defeat the last imperial power threatening European security. A strategic victory over an expansionist and aggressive Russia can be achieved even without direct military confrontation. In addition to supplying Ukraine with all necessary weapons to reclaim its occupied territories in Donbas and Crimea, the Alliance has several options to weaken Russia’s over-stretched multi-regional military and economic capabilities.

Russia’s armed forces do not possess the domestic manpower or functional weaponry to defend the country’s entire western and southern flanks. From the Arctic to the Caspian a sustained diplomatic, economic, and security campaign led by Washington will severely undermine Russia’s resources, divert much of its attention from Ukraine, and enable Ukrainian forces to grind down and defeat Moscow’s enfeebled military.

Along the Arctic and North European fronts, Finland and Sweden need the fastest possible track toward NATO entry. Both Helsinki and Stockholm have overwhelming public support for Alliance membership and Finland in particular has significant military capabilities, a border of over 800 miles with Russia, and direct experience in resisting and defeating Russia’s aggression. The more that Moscow has threatened Finland from entering NATO the more determined the government has become to join the common security structure.

All along the eastern front from Estonia to Bulgaria, NATO needs to organize more frequent military exercises to help synchronize allied defenses, provide more sophisticated weaponry, and ensure a more robust and permanent international troop presence close to Russia’s frontiers. This would send a powerful signal that an attack on any NATO member would result in a multi-national military response on various parts of Russian territory that would stretch, downgrade, and destroy its armies.

The vulnerable state of Moldova needs political and military assistance to protect itself from a Moscow-engineered conflict or even an attempted Russian takeover of the country. The Kremlin has been threatening to open another military front from Moldova’s separatist proxy entity of Transnistria against Ukraine. NATO must signal that any such attempt will result in Moldova being afforded every means to retake its occupied territories while protecting neighboring Romania from any spillover.

Along the Balkan front, Bosnia-Herzegovina which has been targeted by Moscow to destabilize the region through partition, should be placed on a fast track for NATO membership. And NATO forces can be injected in key potential flashpoints in the country to signal a permanent commitment to state integrity. Simultaneously, Kosova must be assisted to qualify for NATO entry. This would undercut attempts by the pro-Kremlin government in Serbia to generate conflicts in order to deflect attention from Moscow’s irredentist war in Ukraine.

Along the Caucasus front, NATO troops need to be dispatched to Georgia to help protect vital energy pipelines between the Caspian Basin and Europe from potential Russian attacks. Georgia itself needs to be brought swiftly into NATO having met all the requirements for membership. Such moves would increase pressure on Georgia’s occupied territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from where Moscow has been withdrawing troops to fight in Ukraine. At the same time, a North Caucasus front can be opened by directly assisting free Chechens and other national units, including Ingush, Circassians, and Dagestanis, who are fighting for Ukraine and against imperial Russia. This will increase fear in the Kremlin over the growth of armed independence movements within the Russian Federation itself. The war in Ukraine will boomerang into Russia and help destabilize the Putin regime.

At an unprecedented meeting on May 26 at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, defense leaders from over 40 states gathered at the invitation of U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to coordinate essential security assistance for Ukraine. A standing “contact group” will hold monthly meetings to evaluate Ukraine’s needs, Russia’s weaknesses, and help guarantee that the West will prevail over imperial Russia. At the April meeting, Germany finally announced that it would ship heavy weapons to Ukraine after enormous resistance from a political establishment that failed to understand Putin and preferred to uphold business with Moscow. Upcoming meetings of the “contact group” will include any state that wants to contribute to Ukraine’s self-defense, whether or not they are NATO members. NATO aspirants will have a good opportunity to demonstrate their commitments and capabilities.

In March, the US European Command created a new unit called the European Control Center Ukraine (ECCU), to coordinate equipment deliveries from Washington and its partners. They have developed multiple routes by air, road, and rail to supply Ukraine with increasingly powerful and modern weapons that will make its military NATO-compatible. The initiative has already facilitated the delivery of equipment from 40 countries and valued at over $5 billion. The US Congress has also voted for a Lend-Lease Act that will significantly increase and speed up military supplies to Ukraine, while President Biden has asked Congress to approve a $33 billion aid package.

In addition to military pressure and destruction of Russia’s imperialist army, the regime in Moscow must also be strangled througheconomic sanctions that precipitate elite power struggles, public revolts, and regional separatism. Economic and financial sanctions should not be eased or lifted until at least four conditions are met: the withdrawal of all Russian troops and proxy structures from Ukraine, including Crimea; the payment of war reparations, including all Russian state assets frozen in Western banks, to rebuild Ukraine’s devastated infrastructure; the resignation or ouster of the Putin regime; and the surrender to an international tribunal of all officials charged with war crimes and potential genocide. Without such clear conditions, the West would inadvertantly allow the Kremlin to restore the Russian economy, rebuild its military, and launch another offensive against a vulnerable neighbor.

Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. He is the co-author of Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks with Margarita Assenova. His new book, Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture, will be published in May.

Analiza Almira Bečarevića: Neizvjesna i teška energetska 2023. godina, čeka li nas još neizvjesnija?

Energetska 2023. godina je u FBiH započela sa poskupljeljem električne energije od 20% za kvalificirane kupce. Cijena gasa je od 01.01.2023. godine smanjena za 9,6% od strane snabdjevača. Cijene goriva na benzinskim pumpama su se kretale od 2,6 KM do 2,96 KM.

Ovako bi glasio uvod u energetsku 2023. godinu opisanu na način Branka Cvejića poznatog ex jugoslovenskog glumca i glavnog lika serije Grlom u jagode. Reklo bi se dosadna i neinteresantna godina sa aspekta energetike, ali kao i u svakoj seriji zaplet mora doci.

Zapleta u energetici, ove 2023. godine, bilo je više, a kruna svih tih dešavanja je bilo saznanje da od Bloka 7 TE Tuzla nema više ništa. Nepovratno je otišlo ulaganje od gotovo 300 mil. KM i nada da ćemo i dalje biti ozbiljni igrači u izvozu el. energije. Ovo je bila najznačajnija loša vijest iz energetike, ali kao i sve druge politike su skinule “prašinu sa sakoa” i nastavile dalje kao da se ništa nije niti desilo. Shvatili smo nakon 15 godina da smo išli “grlom u jagode” sa ovim projektom. Šteta će knjigovodstveno biti otpisana, a ledina za Blok 7 iskorištena za, možda, neki tržni/prodajni centar.

Usvajanje energetskih zakona na Parlamentu FBiH većini koja čini vlast u FBiH bila je izgovor da su nešto radili i da smo na evropskom putu. Tu Evropu još dugo nećemo vidjeti, ali smo vidjeli nove prijedloge cijena za el. energiju po tim usvojenim zakonima. Oni što su se hvalali tim zakonima nisu dobro čitali i nisu uočili da sada imamo samo dvije kategorije snabdijevanja, tržišno i javno.

To tržišno snabdijevanje je stvorilo glavobolju vladajućim pa posegnuše da administrativnom mjerom ograniče rast cijena el. energije do max 20% u 2024. godine. Usvojiše zakon, a onda putem vlade FBiH shvatiše da nismo mi još za tržišno snabdijevanje i usvojiše Odluku kojom se proglašava stanje ugrožene sigurnosti snabdijevanja električnom energijom za 2024. godinu.

Tada je javnost shvatila da nemamo dovoljne količine uglja za JP EPBIH od naših rudnika, da ugalj i dalje moramo kupovati od privatnih rudnika, da nam je pao izvoz el. energije, da će JP EPBIH poslovati sa gubitkom, da nismo daleko od redukcija u snabdijevanju, te da idemo putem kojim ćemo od izvoznika postati uvoznik el. energije. Shvatismo da smo ugroženi i da ovako više ne može i zato proglasiše propast Bloka 7.
“Logično”, zar ne?

Da nije sve crno u ovom sektoru potrudili su se rudari koji novim kolektivnim ugovorom dobiše veće plaće i veću cijenu uglja sto bi trebala biti osnova za uredno snabdijevanje ugljem ovih starih i iznemoglih blokova JP EPBIH.

Zakone usvojismo, regulatora za energiju dobismo i tu stadosmo. Proći će još godina ili dvije dok sistem po zakonu profunkcionira, a tržište ce nam odrediti cijenu el. energije kada shvatimo da administrativnim mjerama nećemo moći vječno držati cijenu el. energije pod takvim vidom kontrole.

Što se tiče prirodnog gasa situacija nam je takva da je dovoljno da otvorimo prozor, bar mi u Kantonu Sarajevo, pa da vidimo kako izgleda kada pada potrošnja gasa u kantonu. Potrošnja gasa pada dramatično, zagađeni zrak truje sve nas, a Skupština KS usvaja energetski bilans za 2023. godinu dva dana prije isteka 2023. godine. Vlada KS umiruje javnost obećanjima kako će riješiti pitanje zraka u Sarajevu isto kao da nisu vlast već gotovo 5 godina.

HDZ je, istovremeno, proglasio Južnu interkonekciju od interesa za hrvatski narod i blokirao usvajanje Zakona o južnoj plinskoj interkonekciji. Krenuli su i oni sa formiranjem transportne plinske kompanije jer kad entitet RS može imati 3 transportne kompanije što ne bi FBiH imala dvije. To što je potrošnja gasa u BiH pala sa nekadašnjih 380 mil. Sm3 na 210 mil. Sm3 to nije nikog briga jer nacionalni interes je bitan. Bitan je i entitetu RS gasovod Nova istočna interkonekcija jer on povezuje prijateljski ruski i srpski narod, a to sto ruskog gasa vise neće biti u EU od 2025. godine koga to briga. Mi valjda nećemo u EU pa ne treba ni da brinemo. Vlast je na državnom nivou glasala za Novu istočnu interkonekciju, a za Južnu interkonekciju valjda misle da sad nije vrijeme pa i ne digoše ruke. Teške ruke, teška EU pa čekajmo neka bolja vremena.

Bio nam je i predsjednik Azerbejdžana g. Aliyev koji se ponudio u sektoru energetike, a posebno gasa. Srbija je istu ponudu prihvatila i za početak kupuje 400 mil. Sm3, a mi ćemo i dalje pričati o potrebi da zamijenimo ruski gas, ali bez rezultata.

Da ne bude sve crno u gasu potrudio se član Predsjedništva g. Bećirovića koji dostavi na Predsjedništvo BiH Prijedlog državnog zakona o transportu prirodnog gasa, regulatoru i unutrašnjem tržištu u Bosni i Hercegovini i sa g. Komšićem usvoji isti na Predsjedništvu i uputi ga u parlamentarnu proceduru.

Što se tiče nafte ista je, svakako, već godinama pod kontrolom inostranih kompanija sa sjedištem u BiH, a terminali nafte će nekada proraditi u punom kapacitetu. Domaći trgovci naftom još uvijek, koliko toliko, opstaju na tržištu i trebaju nasu podršku. Odluka o kvaliteti tečnih goriva je usvojena na Vijeću ministara pa ćemo uz Srbiju jedini markirati gorivo. Evropa napušta i naftu iz Rusije, a mi markiramo gorivo za nečije interese. Rafinerija Brod ne radi, ali to je već pitanje za manji entitet.

Kada sagledamo sve napisano ne možemo se oteti utisku da u energetskim politikama zaista idemo “grlom u jagode” i perspektiva nam je je još crnja od ovog pregleda za 2023. godinu. Svi energetski stručnjaci govore o ovome, ali aktualne politike se prave mrtve na isti način kao i kod zagađenog zraka u KS, pravi se mrtav i samo neka ne puca.

P.S.

Kada smo pomislili da je energetska 2023. godina završila ukazao se i lokalni šerif Elek direktor Sarajevogasa I.S. sa zahtjevom za veće cijene transporta i prijetnjom obustavom gasa FBiH. Valjda je sada jasno zašto nam treba Južna interkonekcija i zašto nam treba državni Zakon o gasu. Gasni ventili na ulazima u BiH treba da su javno dobro, a ne da su od “nacionalnih” interesa ili privatne igračke lokalnih šerifa.

(NAP)

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