

- 1 NT: Another logistical question: Would anyone like coffee or may be tea, water?
2 All right, then I will now... take this away.
3
- 4 GS: Is everyone ready? This is video recording of the interview led by the officials
5 of the Prosecutor's Office with Momčilo PERIŠIĆ and it is taking place in
6 Belgrade ICTY liaison office, starting on Saturday 6 December 2003.
7 Persons... the persons who are present today... I would like to ask you to
8 introduce yourselves so that your voice gets recorded on the tape, are: Mr.
9 Geoffrey NICE...
- 10
- 11 GN: Yes, Geoffrey NICE, main trial attorney, worked on MILOŠEVIĆ case and
12 some other cases...
13
- 14 GS: Nena?
15
- 16 NT: Yes, I am Nena TROMP and I am investigator, working for the ICTY
17 Prosecutor's Office.
18
- 19 GS: And my name is Garry SELSKY and I am an investigator in the Office of the
20 Prosecutor. Vojislava?
21
- 22 VK: Vojislava KATIĆ, interpreter.
23
- 24 MP: I am Momčilo PERIŠIĆ, a person who volunteered to give the interview.
25
- 26 ŽN: Attorney Žarko NIKOLIĆ, who was appointed by the Registry of the
27 Tribunal as defense counsel of Mr. PERIŠIĆ for this interview.
28
- 29 NA: Nemanja ALEKSIĆ, attorney from Novi Sad, Mr. PERIŠIĆ's defense council
30 in Serbia.
31
- 32 GS: Mr. PERIŠIĆ, for obvious reasons and so that this gets recorded on tape do
33 you understand that everything that is being said today by you...is recorded on
34 tape?

1
2 MP: Do I agree with it being recorded on tape, isn't it?
3
4 GS: No, do you understand that there is a recording device here?
5
6 MP: Yes, yes. I understand.
7
8 GS: You have the right to free assistance of an interpreter in case you can't
9 understand or speak the language we use today during this interview. Do you
10 understand?
11
12 MP: Yes I do require free assistance of a person in providing translation service
13 because I am unable to understand the foreign language.
14
15 GS: Thank you. I also have to state that the interview started, at least by my watch,
16 at 03:45 Hrs in the afternoon. Can you understand and communicate through
17 the interpreter?
18
19 MP: Yes. Mainly yes, I just wanted to ask the interpreter not to get annoyed if I
20 have to ask a question from time to time.
21
22 GS: This is not a problem. Is it convenient to you if this interpreter translates this
23 interview today?
24
25 MP: Do you mean yourself?
26
27 GS: Yes.
28
29 MP: By organoleptic evaluation, yes. And substantially... I will see by the end of
30 the interview.
31
32 VK: Would you, please, explain to me what does "organoleptic" mean?
33
34 NA: No, it is all right. OK. Yes

1 MP: No, no, OK.
2
3 GS: During this interview there will a string of questions posed to you. Do you
4 understand?
5
6 MP: Yes.
7
8 GS: Interpreter will translate the questions to Serbian language. You understand?
9
10 MP: Yes.
11
12 GS: Whatever you answer to these questions, the responses... interpreter will
13 translate these responses from Serbian to English. Do you understand?
14
15 MP: Yes.
16
17 GS: A few minutes ago you mentioned asking questions. If you don't understand
18 something, you tell us and we will make an effort to rephrase the question. Do
19 you understand this?
20
21 MP: Yes.
22
23 GS: During the interview, we don't want you to pose any direct questions to or
24 engage in conversation with the interpreter. Do you understand this?
25
26 MP: Yes I understand.
27
28 GS: Based on the information in the possession of the Tribunal, the Prosecutor
29 believes that you are a person in the suspect category, who pursuant to the
30 Tribunal Statute can be accused of certain crimes therefore, before we start
31 this interview I have to inform you about certain rights that you have. Do you
32 understand this?
33
34

1 MP: Yes.

2

3 GS: You don't have to say anything or answer any our questions unless you want
4 it. Everything that you say might be used against you in evidence in a
5 subsequent court proceedings before the Tribunal including trial. Do you
6 understand this?

7

8 MP: Yes.

9

10 GS: All questions that we ask you and all your answers in response to those
11 questions will be recorded on video recorder during this interview and this
12 recording might be used in evidence. Do you understand?

13

14 MP: Yes.

15

16 GS: You have the right to assistance of a legal council or an attorney of you
17 own choice. If you can't afford this service, the Tribunal will organize such
18 assistance at the expense of the Tribunal. Do you understand?

19

20 MP: Yes.

21

22 GS: Are you today represented by the attorneys at your choice?

23

24 MP: Yes.

25

26 GS: At the end of this interview you will have an opportunity to provide additional
27 information or to clarify a situation and in addition you will have an
28 opportunity to say, or to clarify all that you stated during the interview
29 and that, according to you, has remained unclear or ambiguous. Do you
30 understand?

31

32 MP: Yes.

33

34

- 1 GS: After the completion of the interview I will organize for you to receive the
2 tape or the tapes used during this interview. Do you understand?
3
- 4 MP: Yes.
5
- 6 GS: Original tape used to record this interview, will, after its completion, be put in
7 an envelope, the envelope will be sealed and you will then have an
8 opportunity to sign that envelope. Do you understand this?
9
- 10 MP: Yes.
11
- 12 GS: Do you have any questions concerning what I've informed you about?
13
- 14 MP: Will the text of this recording be transcribed?
15
- 16 GS: It will, on our part, but we will give you the tape and the tape will be yours.
17
- 18 MP: But I must say the following: I will recognize only what would be translated
19 into Serbian from the recording and given to me to sign. I will recognize that
20 as my statement. Otherwise everything else could be...the tape could be only
21 used for parallel analyses, to check whether my statement has been transcribed
22 and translated into Serbian language. I did understand you but this does not...
23
- 24 VK: Mr. NIKOLIĆ wants to say something.
25
- 26 ŽN: To add to this. May be this is my mistake, because when explaining the
27 procedure of the interview I used my previous experience and in previous
28 cases I had always received the interview transcript...that has been transcribed
29 from the tape, and I informed Mr. PERIŠIĆ accordingly.
30
- 31 GN: I don't see any problems with you receiving this transcript, however this
32 transcript won't be done immediately and some time will pass before you have
33 received it.
34

- 1 ŽN: I explained all of this to Mr. PERIŠIĆ.
2
- 3 GN: However, you will now receive the recording, while making the transcript will
4 take some time. However, after that time there would be no problems.
5
- 6 MP: Yes, but in case of some misunderstanding...
7
- 8 ŽN: I also explained to Mr. PERIŠIĆ that transcript is not signed. Nothing is
9 signed... Only the receiving note, the delivery note that the transcript has been
10 delivered is signed, while the transcript itself is not signed. I don't think there
11 would be any problems regarding this.
12
- 13 GS: We can't promise anything regarding the time by which it would be done but
14 as soon as we have the transcript we will give it to you.
15
- 16 MP: But if... if during the process any kind of disproportion occurred concerning
17 what had been taken as my statement, and what I consider my statement, then
18 we should check the tape in order to adduce the accurate situation.
19
- 20 ŽN: This is correct.
21
- 22 MP: So in order to prevent this, I think that it would be much simpler to translate
23 the tape into Serbian language to give it to me to sign, and there would be no
24 disproportion in the further process.
25
- 26 GN: We will think of that until tomorrow, but I believe that there would be
27 some logistical problems concerning this transcript due to the length of
28 translation and delay of the whole issue, but we will think about that and tell
29 you tomorrow.
30
- 31 MP: All right.
32
- 33 ŽN: For the end, I believe that by the end of this day the entire procedure will be
34 absolutely clear to Mr. PERIŠIĆ.

1

2 GN: All right. Mr. PERIŠIĆ, we've met earlier this year, together with Mr.
3 ALEKSIĆ and SELSKY afterward. There were few more persons present and
4 an exchange of letters followed, and finally a letter in which you provided the
5 responses to some questions that I posed. Translation of this letter took longer
6 than I actually expected, longer than it should, but in the end I received the
7 translation of this letter last weekend, if I am not mistaken, and concerning
8 what was stated in the letter and your readiness for cooperation as you
9 declared, we thought that an interview with you should be organized as soon
10 as possible. There is no mystery at least concerning one reason for us wanting
11 to conduct this interview as soon as possible, and this is the fact that the trial
12 to MILOŠEVIĆ will soon come to an end, namely at least the part concerning
13 indictment. Now let's start the interview. I thank you for your ... your
14 cooperation and also for your concern about what was correct and what was
15 not... stated in your statement. We thought that it was our duty to assess the
16 responses that you gave us and these responses led to some new questions.
17 Last time I already stated that there were great potentials in your possible
18 testimony so I will not repeat it.

19

20 NT: I am sorry, interpreter's error. This is not about the testimony but about
21 cooperation. So the potential in your cooperation, not testimony.

22

23 GN: I will state two things as to this cooperation. At the highest level, this
24 cooperation implies testimony before the Court at the request of the
25 Prosecutor's Office. Of course it is hard and sometimes even impossible to
26 call as a witness someone whose statement is totally false and the Office of
27 the Prosecutor knows it. Also concerning cooperation, there is another
28 instance when the Office of the Prosecutor does not call a witness, and this is
29 when the Court calls the witness. In such a case the witness is being cross-
30 examined by all parties at the Court. Of course we can't make the Court Chamber to
31 call every witness that we want. We can suggest to the Court Chamber, and they
32 will then, call the witness according to their opinion. I thought that explaining
33 some things would help so that we know what lies before us today, tomorrow,
34 and, as it seems, on Monday. First there are several

1 questions resulting from your statement or to say so from your responses, so
2 we will go through these questions. Beside that we have certain materials,
3 certain documents and also documents concerning intercepted conversation
4 that we would like you to examine.

5

6 NA: Excuse me, if I may add, I think that Mr. NICE said: pre-recording of
7 recorded material.

8

9 GN: No.

10

11 NA: I am sorry.

12

13 GN: May be there would be some other categories of materials and we wish to
14 present this material to you in an organized way, in the way that would not,
15 how to say it, may be upset you. In any case, to say so, in an organized way.
16 /unintelligible/ missed words here. For obvious reason, general PERIŠIĆ we
17 will not reveal, when we can't accept the responses that you are giving, and of
18 course we will make the assessment of the interview itself, only after it has
19 been finished, and only then we will decide on the steps to be taken later. May
20 be it would be helpful if you had a copy of your statement before you, and
21 your attorneys as well, while we go through your statement. Of course,
22 providing that you have the copy with you, isn't it, since we haven't taken the
23 original...the original document with us.

24

25 MP: He means this ...

26

27 NA: ...that you responded.

28

29 MP: Yes. Yes..

30

31 NA: /unintelligible/ in Novi Sad.

32

33 MP: I don't have it either, but...

34

1 NA: I don't have it either.
2
3 MP: Yes. I don't have it either, but never mind.
4
5 GN: This is our mistake for not having made an effort to bring it with us but I hope
6 that you would trust this translation into English that I will read. Let's start
7 with the year '91. In your statement you provided the account of the
8 occurrences from 1991. You mentioned Croatian and Muslim paramilitary
9 units circling around your military facilities in the way that might have been
10 hostile, from May on. At this moment one question: could you accept as a fact
11 that arming of Serbs took place in September 1991, and if it did, how was it
12 carried out?
13
14 MP: Please... would you tell me where. Arming of Serbs – where?
15
16 GN: In Croatia, in general.
17
18 MP: Yes. I plainly stated, in my response to the first question that, during the '91,
19 I was in Zadar until 21 November and then I transferred to Sarajevo. While I
20 was in Zadar...
21
22 VK: Excuse me, may I interrupt you.
23
24 MP: Pardon?
25
26 VK: May I ask you to speak in shorter portions so that I could remember
27 everything and translate if accurately, so as not to /unintelligible/.
28
29 MP: Yes. I would like to ask you to talk a bit louder so that I can understand what
30 you are saying. While I was in Zadar as the Commander of the Artillery
31 School Centre, from 04.05.1991, we were blocked in the facilities, in the
32 town of Zadar itself. I had under my command only permanent forces of the
33 School Centre that was a part of the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/. All the
34 members of the Artillery School Center were armed

1 and this is the practice in all armies of the world. There was no arming Serbs
2 outside of this Artillery School Centre by the Centre and even if there was a
3 will to arm it would not have been possible because we were... because we
4 were blocked and completely isolated by the citizens of Zadar and generally. I
5 say, I stress that the members of the Artillery School Centre did not arm
6 anyone outside of the School Centre, and I don't have material evidence on
7 any possible arming the Serbs in that area by any other institution.

8

9 GN: If I may interrupt you for a moment and...

10

11 MP: Of course. Yes.

12

13 GN: ...interrupt your response. Considering your position that you had held then
14 and later it would be logical to suppose that you had adequate knowledge on
15 general matters that were happening at that time and later on. Do you have any
16 knowledge about arming the Serbs at the very beginnings for example in Knin
17 or you really don't have any knowledge about that?

18

19 MP: I repeat that neither I nor the Artillery School Centre had any part in this, but I
20 have the knowledge on arming of Slovenian, Croatian, Muslim, Albanian
21 para-units with weapons from abroad and parallel to these information I also
22 have information on arming of paramilitary Serbian units by some subjects in
23 these areas. In my position as a high ranking officer, colonel by rank and
24 commander of the Artillery School Centre I followed the development of the
25 political situation and I pointed out, in timely manner, at the danger of civil
26 war breaking out to the members of the Artillery School Center who were of
27 multi-ethnic background, only in the function of keeping the multiethnic
28 structure of the Artillery School Centre senior officers and manpower
29 strength. From that time period I have... my addresses to the senior officers
30 and men of the Artillery School Centre in writing, in which, among other
31 things, I also stated: If the current nationalism in Croatia and Serbia is to be
32 continued, it would certainly lead to civil war and I explicitly stated that the
33 relics of Tsar Lazar, that the Serbs had organized to tour the Serbia, would
34 push out Ban Jelačić into the square in Zagreb and

1 at that time I pointed out that, should MILOŠEVIĆ and TUĐMAN go on
2 heading nationalistic forces, this would definitely lead the civil war. Of
3 course, I am now telling you a fragment that reflected directly to the situation
4 in the area where I was located, but this has a wider background, and I will not
5 talk about it, and what I just told had you caused arming...arming I repeat,
6 illegal arming of Slovenians, Croats, Muslims, Albanians, Serbs, and as the
7 proof, sorry, the proof of this my address, I can bring you as soon as
8 tomorrow the original transcripts from that time and refer to witnesses who have
9 heard that so that you can have it as evidence. And... and among those people who
10 have heard it, there were many, many Croat senior officers, namely non-
11 Serbs.

12
13 GN: Before we...before we proceed to another subject, you mentioned the Serb
14 paramilitary units. Can you tell us what units you had in mind? Who
15 commanded them and who had influence on them?

16
17 MP: Again for the sake of objectivity I am talking about the period when Croatia
18 was not yet recognized. The year '91 - the first riots started on 4 May '91, and
19 I left Zadar on 21 November '91. At that time Croatia was not internationally
20 recognized and excuse me, when I am answering your question I answer it
21 parallel. I do have information that Croatian paramilitary units were armed
22 and tomorrow I will bring you the actual order ... the order by the commander
23 of the Croatian Para Army for the central Dalmatia re their activities from that
24 period, as a proof that Croatian paramilitary units did exist.

25
26 VK: I am sorry I have to interrupt you.

27
28 MK: Sorry.

29 ... and as a reaction to that then the Serbian paramilitary units appeared too.
30 Since I shared the destiny of the members of the Zadar Artillery School
31 Centre and since I was blocked along with them, my contacts with the Croatian
32 paramilitary units were combat activities, while I was unable to contact the
33 Serbian paramilitary units because at the beginning they were physically far

1 away from the town of Zadar, and also from the facilities that I had been
2 staying in. But... the response to your concrete question
3 on Serbian paramilitary units could be the following, but allow me a short
4 introduction before that. Do you allow? The strongest blow to the Yugoslav
5 People's Army members, outside of what is today Serbia and Montenegro, was
6 delivered by three events in the Republic of Serbia, namely separation of the
7 members of other ethnic groups from the Yugoslav People's Army. First this
8 is a letter by the leadership of the SK - Movement for Yugoslavia to establish
9 this movement in the territory of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and in the entire
10 then Yugoslavia because the Communist Party, namely the Communist
11 Alliance had vanished while the Movement for Demo...for Yugoslavia was to
12 replace it. In order to replace the Communist Alliance, it was necessary to
13 determine the cadre that would form the new political organization - the
14 Movement for Yugoslavia. This had a very bad impact on the political parties
15 formed in the area of Croatia and Slovenia, naturally on others too, but I am
16 talking about them because I was present there. The other event which
17 happened here with extremely negative effect on... namely it influenced the
18 separation of people outside of Serbia and Montenegro from the Army...is
19 9 March '91 in Belgrade. Since in all the former Yugoslav republics
20 multiparty systems were introduced, multiparty system caused dissatisfaction
21 in Serbia and Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ, the SPO president organized the 9 March in
22 protest against changes in Serbia. Demonstrations took place in Serbia...

23
24 GN: Of course you are also aware that we know a great deal of what has been said
25 and the time is not unlimited hence I would like to ask you to bring your
26 introduction to an end so that we can go on with next issues, except if there is
27 something dramatically important what you want to deduce out of it.

28
29 MP: Well... through my information I am trying to convey something that I think is
30 insufficiently known to you. The regime in Serbia and Yugoslavia, engaged
31 police and Army to defend themselves from the 9 March demonstrations in
32 Belgrade, this rushed Croatian and Slovenian leaderships to proceed with
33 separation or splitting and produced negative view of Croatian population to
34 the Army in Croatia, because if in Serbia tanks were used against Serbian

1 people to what extent will they be used in Croatia, Slovenia, etc. And the third
2 essential thing is response to your question...end of introduction, and the
3 response to your question, the great Serbian nationalist whom you have in the
4 Hague, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ gathered the nationalists from Serbia and came to
5 Knin Krajina with his followers clad in Chetnik uniforms that especially
6 upset the population of Croatia and had influence on increased activities of the
7 paramilitary of the Republic of Croatia and especially Ustasha units within.

8

9 VK: Sorry, paramilitary actions, it led to the increase of...

10

11 MP: ... the paramilitary units in Croatia and especially the Ustasha units.

12

13 GN: Thank you. Nena would like to ask you a few questions before we continue
14 and I also have a question for you, bearing in mind... in mind the obvious fact
15 that your profession... your knowledge is vast concerning the position that
16 you held. Was Dubrovnik attacked and if yes, why?

17

18 MP: During the attack on Dubrovnik I was in Belgrade... in Sarajevo because after
19 Zadar, the Center under my command was dislocated to Sarajevo. My main
20 activity in Sarajevo was to establish new educational process in the Artillery
21 School Centre.

22

23 GN: Excuse me for interrupting you.

24

25 MP: And my information... Pardon?

26

27 GN: Excuse me for interrupting you. This, I quote, the attack on Dubrovnik was, a
28 subject of great media attention in the whole world. You were in high
29 position. You were in the centre of government. Based on your information,
30 could you say whether Dubrovnik was attacked and if it was, what led to that?

31

32 MP: Yes... excuse me, I must repeat that I was not in the centre of government or
33 may be you translated incorrectly? I did not have any connection with the
34 government or the authorities. This means that from the aspect of my function

1 that I was performing, I did not have to know anything about Dubrovnik and
2 everything I know is the matter of assumption and I can only tell you my
3 opinion as a supposition. If you want to hear it.

4

5 GN: Yes please.

6

7 MP: Since civil war was ongoing in Croatia, since the paramilitary units of Croatia
8 had blocked many facilities of the Yugoslav People's Army, probably the
9 political and military leadership of Serbia and Montenegro, namely the then
10 military leadership of Yugoslavia wanted to establish a kind of balance by
11 conducting the siege of the Dubrovnik. This is naturally an assumption that
12 does not have to be accurate, but...

13

14 GN: You were sitting together with MILOŠEVIĆ and others in many sessions of
15 the Supreme Defense Council and had contacts with all of them, so that you
16 must know exactly /unintelligible/.

17

18 MP: /unintelligible/ two years after the events in Dubrovnik. And once again, if
19 you will allow me, a digression /unintelligible/ so that MILOŠEVIĆ
20 /unintelligible/ past. So that I never discussed Dubrovnik with him but I did
21 talk with some Dubrovnik operation participants, what led to this assumption.

22

23 GN: Mrs. TROMP has a question. May be also Mr. SELSKY and then we will
24 continue.

25

26 NT: My question refers to some issues that you mentioned, that you started,
27 therefore I would like you answer to my question to be a little broader more
28 comprehensive.

29

30 MP: Broader?

31

32 VK: Comprehensive. More detailed.

33

34 MP: Detailed. OK. Agreed.

1

2 NT: I am sorry for speaking English, but I hope you understand me. I am doing it
3 for logistic reasons, while I will understand your responses in Serbian. You
4 said, when asked about your knowledge of arming the Serbian para...
5 paramilitary units while you were in position in Zadar. You responded that
6 you had no material evidence of that. My question is: What kind of
7 evidence do you have about that?

8

9 MP: You need to understand that we, all members of the Artillery School Center
10 were lodged in 4 buildings and blocked by the Croatian Para Army
11 from 4 May until leaving Zadar, until November. I and in general all
12 the other members of the Centre did not have the chance to contact anyone
13 outside the barracks without the knowledge of the Crisis Staff of Croatia, namely
14 Zadar. The Zadar municipality Crisis Staff. Hence, we were unable to participate in
15 anything without the knowledge of the Crisis Staff.

16

17 VK: If I may interrupt you here.

18

19 MP: This is the response to the first part, while the second part...

20

21 VK: Excuse me Mr. PERIŠIĆ.

22

23 MP: And... because of her... yes, yes, yes. I forgot. I know that...

24

25 MP: May I continue? And regarding the 2nd question, when I say - I have no
26 material evidence, it is logical that one does not have to be a hen to know what
27 an egg is, and especially an officer, with adequate education, was able to
28 conclude, from the press and media and from the behavior of the population,
29 that Croatian population and Muslim and Serbian population is getting armed.
30 And when I say that I have no material evidence, I don't know any person,
31 not one Croat arming Croatian population, except from the media that
32 ŠPEGELJ was bringing in weapons from Hungary, but I don't know it, I don't
33 have material evidence of that, for example members of the Knin Corps were
arming MARTIĆ's men, but I have no material evidence, because I don't know

1 anybody an have no documents that this was happening, same way, for
2 example, I don't know who was, involved in arming the Croats in Zadar with
3 stingers. While I know that they did have them, because I've seen stingers
4 being used in operations.

5

6 NT: I would like to continue for a while in that sense. You've mentioned the Knin
7 Corps and the possibility that they provided MARTIĆ with weapons without
8 your knowledge. The question I want to pose refers to your relationship with
9 Ratko MLADIĆ, who was at that time the commander of the Knin Corps. Did
10 you have friendly relationships with him and did you may be conduct any
11 informal conversation about political and military situation in that area
12 considering that both of you were at that time in that area, isn't it? So, what
13 kind of contacts did you have and did you obtain any information from
14 informal contacts with him?

15

16 VK: The interpreter did not say that... it was known as a fact that you had good
17 relationship with Ratko MLADIĆ.

18

19 MP: I wish to let you know the following: that I... at that time, the same way as I
20 had good relationship with Pero STIPETIĆ, Franjo FELDI, who were mine
21 comrades then, not gentlemen but comrades in Croatia, because I worked in
22 the 5th Military District and they were my coworkers, I also had good relations
23 with Milivoj PETKOVIĆ who was a Croatian Mayor, my subordinate in the
24 Zadar Center, and I also had excellent relations with Atif DUGA...
25 DUDAKOVIĆ, who was a Muslim General in Bihać Krajina, and I also had
26 even better relations with Agim ČEKU who was my subordinate, and now
27 he is in Kosovo and Metohija and in that sense I also had relations with Ratko
28 MLADIĆ at that time. But, concretely, let's return to your question, at the time
29 when I was the Zadar Artillery School Centre Commander I had no contacts
30 with Ratko MLADIĆ. I mean, physical contact, because, as I said, we were
31 blocked in Zadar, while he was Commander in Knin. During the year '91 I
32 saw Ratko MLADIĆ only once when we passed through Benkovac, withdrawing
33 the Artillery School Centre out of Zadar. Then I met Ratko MLADIĆ for the
34 first time from the beginning of activities. We greeted each other, I passed

1 Knin, Benkovac, and left to Sarajevo while he remained in Knin Krajina. This
2 is concerning that period, while later I met him on several occasions, but do
3 you want me to tell you now or later through other questions?

4

5 GN: I would say later.

6

7 NT: Later.

8

9 MP: Yes, yes. Ok.

10

11 NT: You mentioned that the blockade of the Artillery School Centre started in the
12 May '91. Did you may be, before beginning of the blockade, before physical
13 disrupting of communications, have any contacts with Ratko MLADIĆ and
14 did you discuss military situation in the area during these contacts?

15

16 MP: I can not say 100%, I must check this first and will tell you later, but it seems
17 that Ratko MLADIĆ arrived to Knin Corps in the 91, I even thing after 4
18 May. I am not sure but it appears after 4 May, so that I had no contact with
19 him before the School Centre blockade, especially because for a while, even at
20 the time of leaving the Centre in Zadar, the Commander was Vlado
21 VUKOVIĆ. The 9th Corps Commander was General Vlado VUKOVIĆ and
22 not General MLADIĆ, so that, during my stay in Zadar, the main man in
23 charge of the 9th Corps was Vlado VUKOVIĆ, the general.

24

25 NA: This is Knin Corps, just explain.

26

27 NT: The rebellion of Croatian Serbs started in August 1990.

28

29 MP: What started?

30

31 VK: The rebellion of Croatian Serbs, the Serbs in Croatia.

32

33 MP: Yes. In August?

34

1
2 VK: In August '90. 1990.
3
4 GS: Excuse us, Mr. PERIŠIĆ but the telephone is ringing and may be it is the time
5 to make a break, so we will make a short break. Now it is 16:21 Hrs.
6
7 MP: May... may I know for orientation purposes, until when will we be working
8 tonight so that I can plan my activities?
9
10 GN: Today, we can stay until 6.
11
12 MP: Until?
13
14 ŽN: Until 6.
15
16 VK: Until 6. Until 18:00 Hrs.
17
18 MP: I agree.
19
20 ŽN: I apologize, but if JOVIĆ's telephone had rang in the courtroom, in
21 MILOŠEVIĆ's case, then... I apologize ... apolog ... But really I apologize, I
22 was not able to switch it off in a hurry. It won't happen again...
23
24 MP: All right.
25
26 GS: We continue after the break. The time is now 16:44 and we continue.
27
28 NT: Does Mr. PERIŠIĆ still remember the question?
29
30 MP: Yes in part, but it would be better if you repeated it.
31
32 NT: In August... August '90, the rebellion started in Knin and, approximately
33 from April '91, the Croatian authorities had no access to that region. This

1 period corresponds with the time of your service in Zadar and I am interested
2 in whether you did have any contacts
3 with some political leaders who... managed to break through, actually with
4 Milan MARTIĆ and Milan BABIĆ? One... one correction: so it was not that
5 the region was, as of April ... that... the region was inaccessible to the
6 Croatian authorities, rather, the Croatian authorities had no control over that
7 region as of April 91.

8

9 MP: Yes, this is known to me and for most of its activities the Artillery School
10 Centre had to cross that very region, and so our leaving for Slunj, namely the
11 Artillery School Center used to cross that region when going to Slunj, and
12 it also passed through that area when it went to *Crvena zemlja*, this is on
13 the northwest slopes of Dinara Mt., northeast from Knin, but I personally did not
14 have any contact in that period either with BABIĆ or with MARTIĆ. I never
15 had any contact with BABIĆ, while I had contacts with MARTIĆ only later
16 after becoming the General Staff Chief, when he was coming to MILOŠEVIĆ,
17 we'll talk about later. And may be it is important here for better understanding
18 that the Artillery School Centers in Zadar – there were three of them. All the
19 three of them were directly linked to the General Staff of the Yugoslav
20 People's Army re Command and Control, but regarding supplies and territorial
21 activities they were linked to the Split Military Naval District. And now, in
22 Zadar itself...

23

24 VK: If I could translate this?

25

26 MP: Translate. And in Zadar there were three centers: Artillery School Centre
27 headed by me, the other ones were the Anti-aircraft School Centre and the Air
28 Force School Center, namely the Air Force base. These three institutions were
29 at an equal level and all the three of them were linked... directly to Belgrade.
30 But, the Garrison Commander, was at that particular time the Commander of
31 the PVO /anti-aircraft defense/ Artillery School Center, and it could not be
32 excluded that he, being the Garrison Commander, had closer cooperation with
33 Split and with political structures in Knin.

34

1 NT: Do you have any personal knowledge about these contacts?

2

3 MP: About...?

4

5 VK: About these contacts?

6

7 MP: Hence: I know that, at that time, the Garrison Commander was Trpko
8 ZDRAVKOVSKI and he certainly knew that and I know for sure that he had
9 contacts with the Military Naval District. Regular contacts. And since at such
10 gatherings, knowing the Army structure, usually commanders at all different
11 levels come together, it is probable the 9th Corps Commander was also there.
12 And since the town of Zadar often denied military members electricity, water
13 and other utilities, and as a reaction to that, the 9th Corps probably denied the
14 town of Zadar the same, to say so - supply routes, then often the Crisis Staff
15 would tell us that in case we wanted to have electricity and water we have to
16 ensure, through the 9th Corps, or the Knin Corps, that the citizens of Zadar
17 can also have it. And that brings me to the conclusion that the Garrison
18 Commander surely had frequent contacts with the Knin Corps.

19

20 NT: The second question: you explained your position in the Yugoslav People's
21 Army in... during your stay in Zadar and you stated that this position was not
22 at functional or operational level. However, in the autumn '91, in the town
23 of Zadar, fighting started involving destruction of property and there were
24 also losses. Also destruction of Zemunik, and the Air Base took place, as you
25 mentioned. Now, I am interested, who was responsible for these operations on
26 the part of the Yugoslav People's Army and who issued operative order for
27 such actions?

28

29 MP: Yes, true it happened in '91...actually not in the ninety... not in the autumn.
30 It happened 4 May. 4 May the first armed activities took place in Zadar, there
31 were huge protests around military facilities and residents, especially the
32 residents of Bibinje, led by nationalists, toured Zadar and marked buildings by
33 specific marks and another group followed them, using agricultural tools and
34 rods to destroy Serbian shop windows, opening fire at...

1
2 VK: Do you want to finish the sentence or...?
3
4 MP: Translate, translate.
5
6 VK: All right.
7
8 NT: I think that we should explain something to assist the interpreter, because it
9 seems to me that she does not quite understand what is it about. There were...
10 there were two movements there, but I will let Mr. PERIŠIĆ to explain what
11 was that about. Mr. PERIŠIĆ, that group from Bibinje, what was their
12 nationality?
13
14 MP: They were of Croat nationality. And... they exerted certain pressure on
15 Serbian residents in Zadar, and then they toured military objects with the aim
16 of causing incidents. Since we anticipated the development, we removed the
17 soldiers so that there was nothing to irritate the demonstrators who went
18 around military facilities. So, please translate. And that day there were no
19 incidents, between the Army members and the demonstrators. And this
20 scenario, prepared for Zadar and avoided, I would say, by our anticipation, the
21 military anticipation, was transmitted to Split, 6 May. And recall the Split
22 events, there's no need for me to explain. Since then every time soldiers left
23 the barracks, for bringing in foodstuff, for resupply or anything...to bring
24 mail, for medical assistance, etc. they were checked, and often attacks were
25 carried out, thefts and even injuries were inflicted on the army members. But
26 the real conflict between the paramilitary of Zadar town and... the JNA units
27 in Zadar happened sometime in the month of August, when the paramilitaries
28 raided military facility called *Turske kuće* /Turkish houses/ and then it was
29 necessary to go from other facilities to the *Turske kuće* to help the soldiers in
30 the *Turske kuće* facility but the paramilitary blocked all exits from the
31 barracks and opened fire on all the barracks in Zadar, and from then to 7
32 October, including 7 October, in Zadar there were always conflicts at night,
33 conflicts, and negotiations at daytime. Concretely, the Artillery School Center

1 lost 4 men. 4 men were killed, while 16 were injured, and none of those wounded or
2 killed had left military facilities.

3

4 GS: General PERIŠIĆ, concerning Ratko MLADIĆ, for how long did you know
5 him? What year did you meet each other?

6

7 MP: I first met Ratko MLADIĆ in the '76, at school that was called General Staff
8 Academy. Then I met him another time in another school called School of
9 National Defense, in the year ninety and...87 and then in Benkovac, as I
10 explained earlier, when I was leaving Zadar in the month of November '91.
11 Then later on I used to meet him on more often, but we'll do it through
12 subsequent questions.

13

14 GS: Of course. When you were in Zadar, did you have any radio communications
15 with Ratko MLADIĆ?

16

17 MP: Did I have...?

18

19 VK: Radio communications, radio connections with Ratko MLADIĆ?

20

21 MP: Yes. Occasionally I did. I did. Occasionally I did.

22

23 GS: Did he request artillery support from your School Centre?

24

25 MP: No, it would have been absurd if he requested artillery support from the town
26 of Zadar because... because there was a kind of front line between the Knin
27 Corps and Zadar, and that line was so far that the artillery under my command
28 in Zadar town, those 4 objects, even if they wanted to they could not have
29 reached reach the line, but there were some Artillery School Center units
30 outside of the town of Zadar, located in the direction of the airport,
31 exclusively under my command. So, he did request fire support from those units
32 but he did not get it. We had not approved his request.

33

34 GS: And why not?

1

2 MP: We had not approved because as I said, in the town of Zadar, from 4 August
3 ... from 4 May to the end of August, roughly, beginning of September we maintained
4 some sort of manageable relations with the Crisis Staff headed by a
5 professor, municipal mayor, Ivo LIVLJANIĆ.

6

7 VK: Excuse me, Ivo...?

8

9 MP: Ivo LIVLJANIĆ. To approve the use of artillery to carry out some tasks might
10 have constituted an abuse of the JNA units, any abuse would have worsened
11 our position in the town of Zadar and now I will take you back to the
12 beginning – I was not the Commander of the Serbian staff of the Artillery
13 School Center Zadar, rather I was the Commander of the Artillery School
14 Center Zadar that was multiethnic in its composition and in which... in which
15 more than 60% officers and soldiers were non-Serbs...of a non-Serb
16 nationality /ethnic background/. More than 50% officers, non commissioned
17 officers and servicemen with non-Serb ethnic background have relocated from the
18 Artillery School Center in Zadar to Sarajevo. Currently in the Yugoslav Army
19 there are more than 10 Croats who were officers in the Artillery School Center in
20 Zadar. Josif POKORNIK, BOŽOVIĆ and thousands of others whom I
21 can't specify now. Also, may be it would be worth mentioning here that an
22 Italian Colonel, who was the Chief of the European Community Mission in
23 Zadar, I can't recall the name right now, when we had joint discussion with the
24 Crisis Staff headed by professor LIVLJANIĆ, received from me the
25 guarantees that no resident of the town of Zadar and its surrounding would be
26 hurt unless they harassed the members of the School Centre. By chance, this
27 Colonel was also present when we reached the Peace Agreement in November
28 '91 and he stated the following "Had you followed Colonel PERIŠIĆ's
29 instructions the town of Zadar would not have suffered any losses and the
30 Artillery School Center would not have left the town in November, the way
31 they did."

32

33 NT: Now, let's go back to one issue. Could you tell us who was the commanding
34 officer during the time period, well from May...

1

2 MP: Who was...?

3

4 NT: Officer, commander, commanding officer... Officers. Officers, I apologize,
5 officers, namely in the period between the May and November '91, hence, the
6 JNA officers who were giving orders for Yugoslav People's Army operations?

7

8 MP: I can tell you who were the commanders. Here, the Commander of the Air
9 Force School Centre was general RISTIĆ, located in the Zemunik Air Force
10 Base. The Zemunik Base Commander was PETROVIĆ at the beginning,
11 Colonel PETROVIĆ, while later he was replaced by Colonel TKAČ.

12

13 VK: TKAČ?

14

15 MP: TKAČ, yes. The commander of the PVO School Centre, at that time, and at
16 the same time the PVO Garrison Commander was Trpko ZDRAVKOVSKI,
17 PVO and Commander of the Zadar Garrison, while the Artillery School
18 Center Commander was Momčilo PERIŠIĆ, present here. This is the
19 complete command structure that had authority over the Army in the town of
20 Zadar.

21

22 GN: We have to put an effort to, well ... to speed up in order to check in the
23 morning... to have a look at those documents. We will leave Croatia soon for
24 tonight, but before that there was a lot of talks about the Virovitica-
25 Karlovac-Karlobag line. What is the significance of this line?

26

27 MP: What is...?

28

29 VK: What is the significance of that line?

30

31 MP: In... in what sense?

32

33 GN: In the sense in which we heard about it – that Croatia should be on the other
34 side of that line.

1

2 MP: Yes, yes, yes. Yes, yes.

3

4 NT: And also the line that your main commanding officer at that time Veljko
5 KADIJEVIĆ mentions in his book as the main strategy.

6

7 MP: The nationalists... the nationalists... Serbian nationalists thought and they
8 think even now and say it openly, among them is also Serbia's presidential
9 candidate Toma NIKOLIĆ who says it even now, that natural border between
10 Croatia and Serbia is Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag. Why? Because
11 settlements with the Serbian population stretch to this topmost west line.
12 Normally, my attitude and my personal opinion is deeply against this and I
13 stated in the beginning that Serbian nationalism promoting Tsar Lazar, heated
14 up Croatian nationalism that pushed out Ban Jelačić ...

15

16 VK: If I may interrupt here, I apologize.

17

18 MP: ...and the conflict occurred as it were

19

20 GN: General MARINOVIĆ while talking about our Dubrovnik case, mentioned
21 that there was a specific military logic concerning the attack on Vukovar and
22 the attack on Dubrovnik, because these attacks were supposed to have led to
23 such a line.

24

25 MP: And who was saying that?

26

27 ŽN: May I say who is Nojko MARINOVIĆ?

28

29 MP: Yes, if you will allow, please. So in addition to... in addition to those Serbian
30 nationalists who have taken this line as a demarcation line between the Serbia
31 and Croatia, this was also based on a 1915 promises, given by Britons and
32 French to Serbs that this would be some kind of line and on this basis they
33 keep heating this issue up and I repeat my opinion and my attitude that this is
34 a real nonsense and that everyone who shares this opinion should be sanctioned.

1

2 GN: Yes, but, this is not about what some individuals have believed, may be the
3 extremists or nationalists. I am interested in whether this line was in the
4 background of military operations in Vukovar and in Dubrovnik?

5

6 MP: No, definitely no. These are the reasons: you are... better informed about that
7 than me, that there was an agreement between TUDMAN and MILOŠEVIĆ
8 regarding division of Bosnia, that it existed. Do translate it. If they were
9 planning division of Bosnia then it was irrelevant to destroy Vukovar or
10 Dubrovnik, protected by international conventions, to do something like that.
11 My later insight, when I became the General Staff Chief, definitely shows that
12 there was no correlation between political and military top. They were
13 actually utterly opposite. You know that the last President of the Federal
14 Republic of Yugoslavia /sic/ was Stipe MESIĆ, while KADIJEVIĆ was Chief of
15 the General Staff. It was not possible for them to have any joint objective. After
16 the creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia many things, the relations,
17 in the relations of the military and political top were disproportional.

18

19 NT: Let's go back to ... the disproportion that you emphasized between the
20 political top of the SFRJ ... headed by Stipe MESIĆ and military leadership
21 lead by Veljko KADIJEVIĆ and incapability of the JNA leadership and
22 political top of having joint objectives. However, the Prosecutor's Office has
23 some adduced evidence, namely registered as exhibit and adduced before the
24 Court during the testimony of Mr. Borisav JOVIĆ and I will tell you what I
25 think after the interpreter has translated this. It refers to military strategy and
26 the use of the Yugoslav People's Army at that time that... that question de
27 facto resulted from forces... distribution of forces created by the Serbian
28 block, namely the 4 members who promoted Serbian policy within the
29 Presidency while other members of the Presidency were unable to push some
30 their, different ideas and such situation, ambiguous situation lasted until
31 October '91, when rump the Presidency was established, and then this rump
32 Presidency was political Commander of the Yugoslav Army for a short time,
33 isn't it, only until April '92. Did you have any knowledge that at least for that

1 short time *de facto* the Commander of the Yugoslav People's Army was that
2
3 rump Presidency?
4

5 MP: Was...?

6
7 VK: Rump Presidency.
8

9 MP: Well, I think that the rump Presidency was not... was not the actual Army
10 Commander, because for a certain period of time, namely, during the
11 existence of that complete Presidency, there was also disagreement. At that time
12 military leadership made great efforts to bring that Presidency into a kind of
13 agreement and to prevent Yugoslavia from splitting. When this failed the
14 rump Presidency was established. Then this rump Presidency did not have any
15 significant influence to the Army.
16

17 GN: But if it is true, if it is true that the efforts of the Army in the attacks on
18 Dubrovnik and on Vukovar were such... that their objective was to reduce the
19 size of Croatia, who promoted such policy that Croatia should be reduced to
20 the Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line?
21

22 MP: First let me respond that the rump Presidency had no main role. Already then
23 military top was in correlation with MILOŠEVIĆ. MILOŠEVIĆ gained main
24 influence on the Army through the rump Presidency. Translate and I'll
25 continue.
26

27 VK: Sorry I did not understand. Did not have main...?
28

29 MP: Had no main role but through the rump Presidency MILOŠEVIĆ influenced
30 the Army.
31

32 NT: Excuse me, if I may repeat the question: did MILOŠEVIĆ through rump
33 Presidency command the Army?
34

1 MP: After the disappearance of the SFRY Presidency MILOŠEVIĆ emerged as a
2 the leader of the Serbian people on nationalistic positions. The Arm... military
3 top was looking for someone,
4 for a political hat. It did not find it in ... the rump Presidency, while
5 MILOŠEVIĆ gained influence on the Army directly and indirectly through
6 the rump Presidency. The attack on...now the response to this your question ...
7 the attacks on Vukovar and Dubrovnik were not intended to reach the Virovitica-
8 Karlovac-Karlobag line. The ostensible objective might have been to reduce
9 the interests and desires of the nationalists. You know that after conquering
10 Vukovar the units of the Yugoslav People's Army could have continued
11 through Osijek and Slavonija towards Zagreb. They did not continue
12 although, some from political and military top wanted it.

13
14 NT: And who were they?

15
16 MP: ... but... but for sure someone who had main role over the Army did not want
17 it, i.e. the rump Presidency and MILOŠEVIĆ. They...they did not want it
18 because otherwise would have started. And who wanted it from the
19 political top? It was ŠEŠELJ. Even today I am saying that. And who wanted it
20 from the military top? Those who wanted it, ... I think it was in Karlobag that
21 Života PANIĆ said that, isn't it? Rump Presidency and MILOŠEVIĆ did not
22 want, it and so the Army did not even start. We are speaking about Vukovar
23 while...

24
25 VK: Excuse me.

26
27 MP: ... while Dubrovnik was besieged and the JNA units passed Dubrovnik
28 towards Ploče and reached Slano. Considering the forces and correlation of
29 parties, they could have easily continued towards Neretva, that is towards
30 Ploče but they did not continue. Why? Because there was probably an
31 agreement between TUĐMAN and MILOŠEVIĆ on division of Bosnia and it
32 would have been insane to go and conquer an area and to leave that area later.
33 And... and... in corroboration of this theory, excuse me... in corroboration
34 of this theory, look at the withdrawal of the JNA units from the area of

1 Croatia. The JNA units in Zadar existed, and ... and were withdrawn, isn't it?
2 In November '91 all JNA units were withdrawn from Zadar. Had the objective
3 been going to Karlobag, they would not have been withdrawn, they would
4 have remained in Zadar. They were withdrawn from Šibenik, withdrawn from
5 Split, withdrawn from Rijeka, Istria, etc. Then from Bihać, Karlovac, etc...

6

7 GN: And at that time, which politician did you... in your opinion the orders for
8 withdrawal were issued by which politician?

9

10 MP: For withdrawal to...?

11

12 GN: For example from Zadar, for withdrawal?

13

14 MP: Formally... formally by... by the Presidency...

15

16 GN: Formally –yes, but in reality?

17

18 MP: Formally – by the Presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, namely
19 the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. And... substantially...
20 substantially, an agreement of military top with MILOŠEVIĆ. Normally, I...
21 this is my opinion and I have some arguments for it, but I can not guarantee it
22 100%.

23

24 GN: All right. If MILOŠEVIĆ brought this decision on withdrawal in accordance
25 with that plan on division, how to explain that MILOŠEVIĆ previously had
26 a plan to expand the territory at the expense of Croatia?

27

28 MP: Hm, this is your theory. I...I...

29

30 GN: And yours?

31

32 MP: I... I... my theory, if you will, related to MILOŠEVIĆ, but this is just a
33 theory, is that he is an exceptionally intelligent person and, this is not theory,
34 this is what I assert, a typical autocrat type, who sensed that based on

1 nationalism he could be another Tito, but not bearing in mind the international
2 developments, not seeing that the Berlin Wall has fallen, he wanted to
3 preserve the Yugoslavia based on social and political regime and ideology, the
4 same way Tito had done it.

5

6 NT: Two questions regarding your previous statement. The fact that the Yugoslav
7 National Army withdrew from the Croatia by December '91 happened within
8 a certain political environment. That political environment was such that the
9 international community intended to recognize Croatia in its so called
10 AVNOJ /Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia/
11 borders and when you say that the Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line was not
12 something that political leadership in Serbia intended to achieve, could you
13 tell me: at the moment when the JNA withdrew in December, in Croatia proper,
14 what was the percentage of territory that stayed in *status quo* and what was the
15 percentage of territory controlled by the Croatian Serbs?

16

17 MP: I left Croatia in November '91, and this is my answer to your question: If the
18 Serbian leadership wanted to keep the Karlovac-Virovitica-Karlobag line, the
19 so successful "Bljesak" /Flash/ and "Oluja" /Storm/ would not have happened,
20 since "Bljesak" and "Oluja" were conducted by the Croatian Army against the
21 Serbian population in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, without any
22 intervention by the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro leadership, at that time
23 the SRJ, and also the Yugoslav Army did not intervene at all. And had the
24 objective of the leadership of Serbia been to keep that line, in that case, they
25 had the means and could have done so. Excuse me.

26

27 NT: My question related to the year '91, December '91 and to extent of Croatian
28 territory under the control of Serbs, at the moment when the JNA withdrew.

29

30 MP: I can not state this precisely, but... but, nothing happened in the year '91...
31 the entire JNA was withdrawn from the Croatia. Do we agree in that? Then, what
32 remained... it was the Serbian Army, called the Army of the Republic of
33 Serbian Krajina which controlled the Republic of Serbian Krajina, where the
34 predominant population was Serbian.

1

2 NT: The question: do you know how much of the Croatian territory was under the
3 Serb Control by the moment when the JNA withdrew?

4

5 MP: I don't want to... I would say roughly this: that this was under the control of
6 Serbian people who were Croatian citizens... Croatian citizens, and not under
7 the control of Serbs from Serbia. And, as to how much was under the
8 control, you know it better than me. This was the Republic of the Serbian
9 Krajina, and the Republic of Serbian Krajina, if we go into this, I don't know the
10 exact percentage, but it involved an extended area around Knin, roughly stretching
11 to Bihać, and it involved Slavonia and Baranja regions. And that would be it, I
12 repeat, under the control of Serb citizens of the Republic of Croatia. In other
13 words, under Croatian control. And... and... and since... and because the
14 Croats had not considered them... those Serbs as their citizens, they expelled
15 them by the "Oluja" and "Bljesak" operations and... and now they are, most
16 of them, our citizens. And this is the worst ethnical cleansing in these areas.

17

18 NT: The meaning of my question was the following: by the time when the JNA
19 withdrew from Croatia, there was one third of Croatian territory under the
20 control of the Croatian Serbs. Do you know what percentage of Serbian
21 population was in that one third of Croatian territory before the year '90?

22

23 MP: Before...?

24

25 VK: The year nine-hundred-ninety.

26

27 NT: Ninety-first.

28

29 VK: Before the nine-hundred ninety-first.

30

31 MP: I know that before the year '90, Croatia had in total 25% Serb residents and
32 that now...that now it has less than... 10%. This is what I know. Now I will...

33

I will say this too: this is the consequence of ethnic cleansing in one third of

1 Croatia in which the Republic of Serbian Krajina was located, before the year
2 '90, I don't know exactly but I think there were 25-30% Croat residents.
3
4 NT: Have you ever heard about the village of Kijevo in Knin Krajina?
5
6 MP: Yes I heard.
7
8 NT: And what did you hear regarding...about it?
9
10 MP: I heard that this village was in the area of Knin Krajina, that it was
11 predominantly populated by Croatian population and that an incident
12 happened which ended in a large-scale migration from that village..
13
14 NT: And that incident... the incident, what was that?
15
16 MP: I do not know exactly, but I think that this was a kind of rebellion that was
17 resolved to the detriment of Croatian population of that village and I am very
18 sorry but the incident should not have led to a later geometric progression of
19 the incident.
20
21 GN: Based on what you said, I suppose that you know very well that Croats
22 were there massacred by Serbs.
23
24 MP: That Croats were...?
25
26 VK: Massacred by Serbs.
27
28 MP: And so were... many Serbs by Croats. But I would like to ask you Mr.
29 NICE, for a small digression. I have some problems, much more now than in
30 May and September, talking to you like this. I am not a nationalist, I accepted
31 the post of the Chief of the General Staff to prevent the then authorities in
32 further abuse of the army in nationalistic sense and during the five and a half
33 years I've helped in many ways to hold back or restrain nationalism in these
34 areas and together with my co-workers I actually forced the political top to

1 stop the war and go for Dayton agreement and to seek peaceful solutions later
2 to any differences. I really respect the Hague Tribunal. Therefore I
3 volunteered to help you. Because of that I am under extreme pressure by
4 nationalists of this country, among other things also a fabricated affair that is
5 linked to my name, so please do consider my cooperation with you as my wish to
6 assist you, and not to hinder you. I had a conversation with Mrs. Carla Del
7 Ponte and then I said that it was not the time and I was not able to cooperate. I
8 am willing to cooperate with you, but please bear in mind in particular the recent
9 developments in this country in the sense of victory of nationalistic forces
10 and... and my level of effort to act the way I act.

11

12 GN: People i.e. military members have the habit of being very precise, and we
13 said until 6, but then we extended 7 minutes beyond that term. We said we would
14 go through your statement in an organized way and that's what we did, though
15 we did not go through much of it. I don't exclude the possibility to talk about
16 Croatia tomorrow again but for tonight I wish to pose a line of questions to
17 which I would only like to get very short answers. In the period after you
18 became the Chief of the General Staff, in the period between...around the time
19 of Srebrenica, hence in the period until Dayton, did you may be provide
20 assistance to the Republika Srpska by sending them personnel, sending them
21 officers, officer cadre?

22

23 MP: Sending...?

24

25 VK: Officer cadre?

26

27 MP: Until... until Srebrenica?

28

29 GN: Yes, until Srebrenica but also after that time.

30

31 MP: Yes, yes. Yugoslav People's Army was composed of officers from the entire
32 Yugoslavia. The Supreme Council brought the decision that the officers from
33 that area should go to the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the
34 Army of the Republika Srpska, those who were born in that area and the

1 majority of officers were composed, namely in the Army, since you are asking
2 about it, in the Army of the Republika Srpska, of those who were born in that
3 area and part of the officers were born outside of that area, but only on
4 voluntary basis.

5

6 GN: Did you may be provide assistance to the Republika Srpska also in the form of
7 some other military personnel, not only officers, but also other ranks?

8

9 MP: I repeat, we did not provide assistance, as the Army of the Republika Srpska
10 was established the same way as the Croatian Army of the officers and
11 soldiers ...The same way as Croatian Army was established of the officers and
12 soldiers born in the area of Croatia, the Army of the Republika Srpska was also
13 created of the officers born in the area of the Republika Srpska. Meaning that
14 we did not provide assistance, it was created that way. So we will continue.

15

16 GN: Did you offer assistance in the form of weapons?

17

18 MP: And... and from... the assistance in the form of weapons was not provided at
19 all, except that Republika Srpska was buying arms in Yugoslavia from special
20 purpose production companies, but this was out of the authority of the
21 Army and the General Staff. But it did not need to get supplies from the
22 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as majority of special purpose production and
23 majority of warehouses and reserves supplies, in particular weapons and
24 equipment, were in central part of our country, called Bosnia and

25 Herzegovina.

26

27 GN: Did the SRJ provide money to the Republika Srpska, including money for
28 politician of the Republika Srpska?

29

30 MP: For?

31

32 VK: For politicians.

33

- 1 MP: I inherited the situation... inherited the situation so that part of the funds were
2 given... they were given to the Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian
3 Krajina, however not based on the decision of the Army, but on the decision
4 of the Federal Government... Federal Government.
- 5 GN: We heard the testimony of more than one witness in the sense that, if
6 support to Republika Srpska by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
7 withdrawn during the period of two years from the year '93 to mid '95, the
8 war would have been over and the Srebrenica would not have happened. What
9 is your opinion think about that?
- 10
- 11 NT: Of course, this implies financial assistance not just any kind of assistance.
12
- 13 MP: According to... First I am not so sure that it would have happened this way,
14 but I am sure that... may be Srebrenica would not have happened, but may be
15 a Kalinovik, for example would, or a Trebinje, or what do I know,
16 Gacko, etc.
- 17
- 18 GN: Never mind, let's finish this for tonight. Thank you a lot.
- 19
- 20 MP: You are welcome. I would only like to know until when tomorrow, so that I
21 can plan my time accordingly.
- 22
- 23 GS: We will talk about that after we switch off the device. Now do you want to
24 add something, do you wish to add something in order to clarify something that
25 we spoke about during the previous three hours?
- 26
- 27 ŽN: If this happens it will be tomorrow.
- 28
- 29 MP: To clarify while it is still being recorded or out of... out of recording?
- 30
- 31 ŽN: No, no everything goes on the tape, nothing is done without recording.
32

- 1 MP: I made a digression a little bit earlier to clarify what I needed, and I thank you
2 for allowing it, concerning the conditions in which I am doing this. And
3 please do bear this in mind.
4
5 GS: The tape is expiring. Mr. PERIŠIĆ, now the time is 15 minutes, fifteen ...
6 6:15 Hrs, and we will continue tomorrow.
7

UNREVISSED